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Depending on one’s point of view, climate change is a serious global threat, a multi-billion dollar research
industry, the subject of endless negotiations and lobbying, a potential source of North-South conflict, or
a new basis for North-South co-operation. The last two are especially relevant to the Inter-governmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), as it begins to focus on development, sustainability, and equity. The
IPCC is an international scientific body charged with assessing the scientific literature on the existence,
impact, and potential policy responses to climate change. Although initially the IPCC focused on climate
alone, it has increasingly come to incorporate economic, social, and political factors into the scope of its
work, both for enriching its analysis and guiding policy makers. In particular, there is considerable recog -
nition that in order for policy options to be both feasible and defensible, they must be germane to North-
South co-operation. This will depend largely on how issues of sustainable development and equity are
treated.
This raises a fundamental question. Is there a way of approaching and defining sustainable development that
would further North-South co-operation? In this essay, I review conceptual issues in sustainable development to
explore this possibility. I contrast a mainstream approach, which focuses on valuation issues, with an alternative
approach, which is based on the notions of “resilience” and “durability”, and argue that the latter is more appro-
priate for this purpose besides being more useful for understanding and operationalising the idea.
Sustainable development
In an over-used quotation, the Brundtland Report defines sustainable development as development that meets the
needs of the current generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It
has been acclaimed as a breakthrough, a balanced definition that integrates social and economic concerns with
environmental ones, efficiency with equity, inter-generational with intra-generational equity, and most importantly,
Northern interests with Southern ones. However, although the ubiquity of references to this definition suggests a
degree of professional consensus, such is not the case. There is considerable professional disagreement, most-
ly on how to put the idea into operation, but also on questions of definition and on its claims to synthesis. 
For example, Qizalbash (1998) criticises the invocation of “inter-generational equity”, arguing instead that [at least
from a southern perspective] the real goal of sustainable development is inter-generational inequity, namely the
assurance that future generations would not suffer from the same deprivations and injustices that exist today. To
be fair, as Qizalbash notes, the Brundtland Report does try to finesse this issue by mentioning the future genera-
tion’s ability to meet its needs - presumably more effectively than the current generation - but this simply trans-
poses the need for inequity from the domain of needs to that of ability.
This is not a simple social science versus natural science debate. Indeed, this would be a way of engendering 
co-operation between the two camps. As Amalric (1994) remarks, the greater the reliance on a social science
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Letter from the Chair
Much has happened since the last newsletter. IUCN cele-
brated its 50th anniversary with a public event and a sympo-
sium on three themes: Conservation, Communities, and
Consumption. If you are interested in further details of this
event, you may wish to consult recent issues of the IUCN
newsletter, The Way Ahead, or wait for the publication of the
symposium proceedings. If you seek a critical perspective,
one appears under my name later in this newsletter.
On institutional news, IUCN has a new Director General, Dr
Maritta Koch-Weser, an anthropologist by training, and until
recently a senior staff member of the World Bank. Maritta is
the first woman and the first social scientist to be appointed
to this position. This is a good omen for CEESP, which has
often felt that its social agenda is at best an uninvited guest
at the table. Under the new leadership, IUCN has the oppor-
tunity to integrate social and natural sciences into a coherent
programme and policy.
A new head of the Social Policy Unit has also been appoint-
ed. She is Maria Cristina Espinosa, a Peruvian national, who
has been working for the past 25 years on issues of commu-
nity development and environment in Latin America. The
head of the Social Policy Unit is one of the three headquar-
ters staff positions of the greatest relevance to the CEESP
agenda—the other two being the head of the Economic
Services Unit (Frank Vorhies), and the Head of the Global
Policy Division (vacant). 
There has been a high rate of turnover in the Social Policy
Unit, leading to a marked discontinuity in the programme. All
previous incumbents faced severe difficulties in achieving
their goals. This is probably a reflection of the difficulties of
championing the social agenda in the Union. In traditional
programmes, there is synergy between the secretariat and
the commissions. WCPA interacts with and supports the pro-
tected areas programme of the secretariat; CEL and the
Environmental Law Centre are virtual extensions of each
other; and so forth. These programmes have continuity in
their substance as well as personnel, and create positive
incentives for the cultivation of expert networks. On the one
hand, the experts feel that their advice is useful for the pro-
gramme, and on the other hand, they select themselves with
a clear knowledge of the nature of the programme. In the
past, this was not the case in the Social Policy Programme. 
Take the case of the Collaborative Management Working
Group, a network of top class practitioners and experts in an
area of critical importance to the Union. As long
as Dr Grazia Borrini-Feyerabend headed the
Unit, there was close synergy between this net-
work and the secretariat-led programme. With
her departure the network no longer has an
anchor in the Union. If personnel changes lead
inevitably to changes in programmes, the signal
to commissions—namely to link themselves to
politically secure individuals—is hardly a basis
for optimism. 
Given that the incoming DG is a social scientist,
and has also managed large programmes and
networks, it is possible that the situation will
change, and that we will see a greater determi-
nation and continuity in the social and econom-
ic programmes. 
On CEESPmatters, the first joint meeting of the
CEESP Steering Committee and the Ring took
place at Gland on February 3-5, 1999. The
meeting discussed and approved a joint work
programme for the year.
In order to assist in the transition in the secre-
tariat, the joint meeting of the CEESP steering
committee and the Ring decided to propose to
the incoming DG that a conference on the social
sciences and conservation be convened in
Gland later this year. The conference would
have three inter-related goals. First, to review
from a social science perspective the lessons
learned in traditional conservation programmes.
Second, to examine broad social and economic
processes that could swamp micro level inter-
ventions. Third, to identify the economic and
social agenda for the Union.
The DG-designate has shown considerable
enthusiasm for this idea, and called a meeting
on March 19, with senior secretariat staff and
available CEESP members, to brainstorm over
the conference plans. We will post these plans
as they evolve, and your comments and advice
would be more than welcome.
You will also notice that the theme of this
newsletter was changed to climate change from
sustainable livelihoods (which will now
be covered in the next issue). This will
both take advantage of and help those
from the CEESP-Ring networks that are
involved in the Inter-governmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The
next meeting of the IPCC Lead Authors
is in late April. The IPCC is an interna-
tional scientific body charged with
assessing the scientific literature on the
existence, impact, and potential policy
responses to climate change. Although
the IPCC’s initial focus was on climate
alone, it has increasingly incorporated
economic, social, and political factors
into the scope of its work. Given that the
feasibility and defensibility of policy
options depends critically on legitimacy
within North and South, sustainable
development and equity have become
fundamental to the debate. 
A second reason is that IUCN has start-
ed a global initiative on climate change.
Brett Orlando of IUCN’s Washington
Office, who is responsible for co-ordi-
nating this initiative, informs me that the
secretariat is engaged in specifying its
terms of reference and work plan.
Again, we felt that the role of the social
sciences and especially that of equi-
table and sustainable development
ought to figure centrally in the specifica-
tion. The articles assembled here will be
of help to the secretariat in this exercise.
While the views of the writers in this
newsletter are quite diverse, one theme
appears to be common, explicitly or
i m p l i c i t l y. Sustainability requires the
conservation of both the social system
(and in particular social justice) and the
ecological system. Policies and actions
that erode social capital are as likely to
create irreversible harm as those that
endanger biological diversity.
Tariq Banuri
Dear Colleagues,
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framework to address sustainable development, the greater
the need for natural science information, and vice versa. If
science is viewed as the domain for the production of public
knowledge, there is a need to invest in institutions that pro-
duce such knowledge at the local as well as national or glob-
al levels, and in the South as well as the North. 
The welfare optimisation
approach
Be that as it may, the most common economic construct for
operationalising sustainable development is by visualising it
as a maximisation of human welfare, subject to environmen-
tal and social constraints. This is a static approach, which
interprets sustainability in terms of an “ideal” state - an aggre-
gate level of capital, area under forests, number of species,
income distribution, GHG concentration - rather than of the
solution of existing problems in the presence of uncertainty,
inequality, shocks, and irreversibilities. 
The welfare optimisation approach has generally advocated
the conservation of a given stock of capital. The argument is
that human welfare depends on the level of income, and this
in turn depends on the stock of income-producing capital.
Besides physical or reproducible capital (durable structures
or equipment produced by human beings), this perspective
often invokes natural capital (natural resources and biodiver-
sity), human capital (the productive potential of human
beings), and a recent addition, social capital (norms and insti-
tutions that influence interactions among humans). Simply
stated, in this construction, development is sustainable if
some aggregate index of capital is non-decreasing. However,
there is not much discussion of the desired level of capital. It
is left either to chance (the existing level of capital), or to the
(unequal) process of international negotiation. 
On the precise composition of the desired stock of capital,
there are differences. The “strong sustainability” argument of
the so-called “London school” (Pearce, Barbier, Turner) holds
that different forms of capital are completely non-substi-
tutable, and that therefore ecological sustainability requires
the maintenance of a fixed (or minimum) stock of natural cap-
ital (Amalric 1995). By the same analogy, one could maintain
for example that it requires the conservation of a minimum
stock of human and social capital as well. At the other end is
the “weak sustainability” argument of the neo-classical
school, namely that all forms of capital are perfectly substi-
tutable, and the preservation of an aggregate
level of capital is sufficient for sustainability.
To give an example of the application of this per-
spective, the goals of the three working groups
set up by the IPCC for its Third Assessment
Report can be re-defined as follows:
Working Group 1 (the atmosphere): an
assessment of ongoing dis-investment in one
component of natural capital; 
Working Group 2 (adaptation): identification of
compensatory investment possibilities in other
forms of capital; and 
Working Group 3 (mitigation): identification of
mechanisms for reversing the dis-investment
without significant dis-investment in other forms
of capital. 
The weak sustainability argument supports
adaptation, in other words, compensating for
the loss of “climate capital” by the enhancing of
other forms of capital (sinks, coastal protection,
air conditioners, and so on). The strong sustain-
ability school, on the other hand, provides grist
for the mill of mitigation. 
Reverting to sustainable development, the stick-
ing point in this formulation is valuation. Indeed,
the goal of this approach seems to be to replace
ethics (what is valued) with economics (what is
valuable), in the hope presumably that the latter
would be more conducive to consensus build-
ing. At the very outset, this raises the ethical
question of whether it is proper to describe the
environment (or society) as a form of capital, in
other words, whether it is proper to
assign (monetary) values to things that
are inherently beyond valuation. 
Even if this were ignored, there is still
the problem of finding the correct shad-
ow price of non-market (or collective)
goods or services, say natural capital
(e.g., forests, biological diversity).
Without this, we cannot determine
whether a particular form of capital was
decreasing or increasing in the aggre-
gate. There are similar questions about
aggregation and indexing, the rate of
discount, and the valuation of costs
and benefits under uncertainty.
While “social capital” is an elegant
heuristic device for integrating such
intangible factors as equity, justice and
participation into the analysis, it multi-
plies the underlying measurement
problems tenfold. The main argument
for invoking social capital is that collec-
tive action is based on the existence of
a number of contributory factors, the
most important being “trust”, which like
other forms of capital, have to be creat-
ed over time (see Banuri et al 1994).
Absence of trust increases monitoring
costs, diminishes incentives for co-
operation, exacerbates conflict, and
obstructs collective action. Actions that
increase natural capital while degrad-
ing social capital (undermining trust,
destroying collective institutions) would
be self-defeating in the long run. Just
as biodiversity sustains the ecosystem,
cultural diversity, social capital, social
institutions, the shared conceptions of
justice, mutual trust, and the equity of
social choices sustain the social sys-
tem. Yet, as would be obvious, convert-
ing intangible concepts into measur-
able and quantifiable values would be,
if anything, even more intractable than
in the case of natural capital. 
Sustainable development and climate change
(continued from page 1)
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Just as biodiversity sustains
the ecosystem, cultural
diversity, social capital, social
institutions, the shared
conceptions of justice, mutual
trust, and the equity of social
choices sustain the social
system.
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the long-term (see Amalric 1995). It
asks not whether a particular policy is
consistent with several different goals,
or whether it would turn out to be
acceptable to several different groups
(including the non-voting future gener-
ations), but simply whether it will last. 
Durability depends on the resilience of
the underlying systems, which in turn is
based on three components: the
shocks themselves, the vulnerability of
the system to such shocks, and its
capacity to cope and adapt. This is a
dynamic rather than a static approach,
in that it looks at uncertainty and
response, and at the speed and impact
of the process of change. Second, it is
pragmatic in political content. It con-
verts the ethical question of “what is
valued” not into a measurement ques-
tion (“what is valuable”) but into a prac-
tical question, “what will last” or what
will work. Actions that undermine the
resilience of the system—loss of biodi-
versity as well as the destruction of
social capital—are problematic not only
intrinsically but also because they can-
not last. Finally, its prescriptive content
is oriented towards the creation of
capacity (or resilience) rather than the
achievement of distant goals through
uncertain means. 
Another analogy is with mainstream
economics. The welfare optimisation
approach is analogous to general equi-
librium theory, while the durability
approach is analogous to Keynesian
macroeconomics. The latter is dynamic
in nature, has pragmatic ethics, and a
critical approach to the relationship
between knowledge and power. The
former advocates either the strength-
ening of the systems of surveillance, or
a reduction of the role of the state and
a greater reliance on the market. 
ecosystem resilience, rather than in preserving
genetic information as such” (p. 8). Perrings and
Opschoor stress the tremendous significance of
this switch in emphasis, in effect, making the
benefits of biological diversity “both wider than
has been thought, and more highly localised”
(p.9). 
Others have remarked upon the relationship
between risk, resilience, and governance (see
Rayner and Malone 1998), and argued that the
purpose of policy should be to develop coping
capacity and strengthen resilience of vulnerable
communities, instead of the vague ideal of inter-
generational equity.
The same switch in emphasis can help in get-
ting the concept of sustainable development out
of its theoretical impasse. In order to elaborate
on this point, let us label the mainstream
approach in the economics literature as “optimi-
sation”, and contrast it with an alternative
approach, to be termed “capacity building”. The
conventional approach defines sustainability in
terms of simultaneous progress towards three
goals—conservation, development, and equi-
ty—often as measured by an aggregate level of
capital. The alternative approach, on the other
hand, defines it in terms of “durability”: sustain-
able development is “development that lasts”
(WB 1992: 9). The key question here is to
ensure that the direct beneficial impact of a pol-
icy or action is not reversed by its adverse eco-
logical or social consequences. This approach
emphasises not the tension between ecological
and social goals, but that between the short and
An alternative approach:
Resilience and durability
In order to overcome such a conceptual impasse, it would be
useful to enrich the static formulations of economists by bor-
rowing from the arsenal of ecologists. Recall that the debates
over the economics of biological diversity too were driven ini-
tially by concerns over uses values, intrinsic value, and relat-
ed measurement issues. In the end, however, it became dif-
ficult to have a serious conversation on such issues, since
intrinsic value is based on incommensurable and unchal-
lengeable ethical considerations, and use values are subject
to serious methodological and measurement difficulties. 
A more fruitful line of thinking in the ecological literature is
that which focuses on the resilience of the ecosystem.
Perrings and Opschoor (1994) in their introduction to a spe-
cial issue of Environmental and Resource Economics, define
sustainability as “the maintenance of a level of biological
diversity and a scale of economic activity that will guarantee
the resilience of the ecosystems which support human con-
sumption and production [emphasis added]” (p.2). They go
on to suggest that “[while there is no consensus on this
issue], increasingly, ecologists are arguing that the main
importance of biological diversity lies in its role in preserving
CLIMATE CHANGE
Just as biological diversity
has come to be recognised as
the “spine” of ecological
resilience, justice is the
“spine”, the keystone of
social resilience.
Flooding in the Tana River Valley, Kenya, has resulted in
villagers’losing their cattle, crops and clean water
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the feasibility and sustainability of tra-
jectories also depends upon the distri-
bution of burdens not only in a static
sense, but also at different points in
time. It is possible that many develop-
ing countries cannot slow down their
rates of growth (let alone reverse them)
without severe social dislocation and
political instability. However, given
time, and given investment in institu-
tions things might become more
tractable. Similarly, in northern coun-
tries, lowering of energy or materials
use might lead to unemployment,
which is strongly correlated with social
unrest, crime, psychological disorders,
and generalised problems. Again, a
of poor populations within countries will also be
unsustainable for much the same reasons.
In other words, we have to look at the joint
social-ecological trajectories of various options.
Some trajectories will be unsustainable for cli-
matic reasons, others for biological reasons,
and still others for socio-political reasons—
because they lead to conflict, violence, degra-
dation and instability. (Indeed, it is not impossi-
ble to speculate that all trajectories might be
unsustainable).
Related to this is the speed of change. The flex-
ibility of communities as well as countries
depends upon their institutions, systems of gov-
ernance, and systems of knowledge. Likewise,
The relevance of this argument to sustainable development
is that resilience and durability are the property not only of the
ecosystem but also of the social system. Just as the indis-
criminate destruction of biological diversity can undermine
the resilience and hence the life-supporting qualities of
ecosystems, so also the destruction of institutions or values,
and in particular the abandonment of justice can undermine
the life-supporting qualities of social systems. Just as envi-
ronmental degradation is not sustainable, neither is inequity;
it invites conflict, resistance, and violence, all of which under-
mine the resilience of the social system. Similarly, develop-
ment that deepens poverty or promotes ignorance is not sus-
tainable. Policies and actions that undermine social capital
lead to reactions that reverse any progress that is achieved.
Finally, just as biological diversity has come to be recognised
as the “spine” of ecological resilience, justice is the “spine”,
the keystone of social resilience. Justice is to social capital
what biodiversity is to natural capital. 
This is a redefinition of the term “capital” used above. Instead
of seeing capital as a fixed stock of (tangible or intangible)
assets, it presents it as a basis for coping with shocks, and
avoiding irreversible harm. 
There is a “substitutability” question here as well. The ques-
tion is whether resilience can be analysed purely in the eco-
logical or sociological domain. Non-substitutability would
imply that the resilience of an ecosystem depends not only on
its natural resource characteristics but also on the social
organisation, prosperity, knowledge levels, and values of the
human populations that inhabit it. Actions that lead to con-
flicts or wars are just as damaging to the ecosystem as those
that destroy biodiversity. In fact, as argued in the recent liter-
ature on environmental security, the two are inter-related.  
This gives an additional way of looking at the discussion of
north-south equity, intra-national equity, and even inter-gen-
erational equity. Instead of asking whether any particular dis-
tribution pattern is ideal, this would ask whether some distri-
butions are durable. Many, like myself, would argue that a
solution that restricts the South to 0.5 tons of carbon per capi-
ta while allowing the north to sustain 5 or even 3 tonnes per
capita would not be durable. This is not because of its “ugli-
ness” but because it will not be able to garner the co-opera-
tion of southern countries or their populations. It will invoke
various forms of resistance and opposition, and even vio-
lence. Similarly, a solution that fails to address the problems
CLIMATE CHANGE
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properly planned programme might be able to achieve this
goal without the associated social breakdown. In other
words, it might be possible to protect or conserve natural cap-
ital without undermining social capital in either the north or
the south, and indeed in the globe as a whole.
What does this imply in terms of an action programme? At the
minimum, action must focus at five levels:
Traditional community arrangements : In Southern coun-
tries, the degradation of renewable resources has been occa-
sioned by the breakdown of traditional institutional arrange-
ments that often covered use activity in considerable detail.
This process has been driven by the imperatives of centrali-
sation, nation building, and development. In many cases, the
solution must involve greater reliance upon and the rejuve-
nation of traditional community arrangements.
Sustainable livelihoods : At the local level (analogous to
ecosystems) one can think of the resilience of communities,
of their ability to cope and adapt. In the poverty eradication
literature, this view is advocated by the sustainable liveli-
hoods school. This school looks at poverty not in terms of
income levels, but in terms of (tangible and intangible) assets
including in particular the coping and adaptive strategies of
the poor.
Governmental capacity : Recent years have also witnessed
erosion in the capacity of governmental institutions in the
South under the joint onslaught of corruption, overburdening,
and debt and financial crises. This erosion pertains in partic-
ular to institutions of monitoring and surveillance, without
which neither targeted policies nor market-based instruments
can be used effectively. However, new institutional forms,
based on a partnership between the public and private sec-
tor have emerged in the meantime. Policies and solutions
would have to examine the possibilities created by these
innovations.
Research capacity : Finally, capacity for research and analy-
sis is distributed inequitably around the world. It is also tar-
geted mainly at national governments and not at local gov-
ernments or alternative institutional arrangements for collec-
tive action.
Global governance : At the global level, we need to think of
the building of trust to engender co-operation across coun-
CLIMATE CHANGE
tries. The various options advocated can be
evaluated on this dimension as well.
Summary
To summarise, it is possible to evaluate various
options in the climate debate in at least two dif-
ferent forms: how they affect the aggregate cap-
ital endowment; and how they affect the
resilience of the system to respond and adapt to
change. Both assessments require a joint exam-
ination of ecological and social systems. We
have tried to argue that the latter approach is
more practical and more equitable. It complete-
ly transforms the question. Instead of weighing
the present generation’s good against that of the
future generation, it asks how to build capacity
for protection and resistance. 
To use a metaphor from another literature, the
entire proposed response to climate change can
be viewed as a global programme of structural
adjustment. It is likely to suffer from the same
problems that plagued traditional structural
adjustment programmes in Southern countries.
These programmes were criticised for being
inequitable, socially regressive, and harmful
towards human development. If we can
use some of the lessons from the earli-
er literature, we might be able to avoid
its worst excesses.
Bibliography
Amalric, F . (1995) Bringing the Political
Back in: Essays in Economic Knowledge,
Politics, and Ecology, Ph.D Dissertation,
Harvard University
Banuri, T., G. Hyden, C, Juma, and M.
R i v e r a (1994) Sustainable Human
Development: From Concept to Operation:
A Guide for the Practitioner, New York:
UNDP
Banuri, T, and Apffel Marglin, F . (1993)
Who Will Save the Forest?, London: Zed
Press
Gadgil, M., and R. Guha (1995) Ecology
and Equity: The Use and Abuse of Nature in
Contemporary India, New Delhi: Penguin
Books
Perrings, Charles, and Hans Opschoor
(1994) The Loss of Biological Diversity:
Some Policy Implications, Environmental
and Resource Economics, 4: 1-11
Qizalbash, Mozaffar (1998) S u s t a i n a b l e
Development: Concepts, Measures, and
Conflicts, Islamabad: SDPI
R a y n e r, Steve, and Elizabeth Malone
(1998) Human Choice and Climate Change,
Columbus, OH: Battelle Press
8............Policy Matters
Dealing with the potential impact of climate change is no
less important than efforts to reduce the scale of the cli -
mate problem through emission control and sequestra -
tion. Even with the greatest political will, climate change is,
to some degree, inevitable because of the magnitude of the
emissions reduction required to halt global warming com-
pletely; a twin-track strategy of mitigation and adaptation is
essential. It is fair to say, though, that at the international level
far more attention has been paid to emission control than to
efforts to ease the impact of climate trends. This is despite
the fact that, for the bulk of the world’s population, it is the
potential impact of climate change that must be of most
immediate concern.
One often-cited reason for this neglect is that planning for an
uncertain future is extremely difficult, if not impossible. The
problem is that we do not have reliable forecasts of world cli -
mates in the year 2020, 2050 or 2100 that can be used as a
basis for planned adaptation. Moreover, at a time when we
cannot define the scale of the threat posed by global warm-
ing with precision and action is restricted to precautionary
measures, just what does a precautionary approach to reduc-
ing climate impacts entail? 
In our view, a precautionary approach to reducing climate
impacts must begin by identifying “win-win” situations in
which action to reduce future risk also reduces present-day
vulnerability, not only to climate change but also to other envi-
ronmental problems and to social and eco-
nomic pressures. Placing vulnerability at the
centre of the analysis is the key, side-stepping
the uncertainties that plague any attempt to
define more prescriptive adaptive strategies.
In a recent project funded by the UK
Economic and Social Research Council, we
have studied changing patterns of vulnerabil-
ity in coastal regions of northern Vietnam in a
series of case studies, drawing out the many
influences on the ability of local communities
to respond to environmental stress through
coping, recovery and adaptation. We have
been assisted in this work by Dr Nguyen Huu
Ninh at the Centre for Environment Research
Education and Development in Hanoi and
collaborators from the National University of
Vietnam (Hanoi).
Defining vulnerability to climate change
Mick Kelly and Neil Adger
In our case studies, the primary concern has
been with vulnerability to short-term hazards, in
particular, tropical cyclone impacts. It is, after
all, short-term hazards and extreme climate
events on the seasonal and interannual
timescale that the bulk of any population experi-
ences and reacts to, rather than long-term
trends, and it is through the varying character of
these events that any long-term change in cli-
mate will first be manifest.
We have based our examination of vulnerability
to climate variability on an understanding of the
human use of resources. Following Sen and
others, we consider that the extent to which indi-
viduals, groups or communities are “entitled” to
make use of resources largely determines the
ability of that particular population to cope with
and adapt to stress. Social vulnerability to cli-
mate change is dependent on the availability
and distribution of entitlements, the means by
which entitlements are defined, contested and,
therefore, change over time, and the wider polit-
ical economy of the distribution and formation of
entitlements. This complex of factors together
forms the construction we term the “architecture
of entitlements.” 
The context for these studies has been
the process of doi moi, underway in
Vietnam since the late 1980s. Doi moi,
literally “new road” or “new change,” is
interpreted as “economic renovation.”
The process, resulting in marked eco-
nomic growth sustained even through
the crisis in Asian economies beginning
in 1997, has involved privatization of
the state owned industries and of major
product and marketing organizations,
price reform, and major changes in
property rights in the agricultural sec-
tor. At the same time, political control
has been retained by the Communist
Party. Doi moi is having a profound
effect on the capacity of the agrarian
communities to respond to environ-
mental stress, particularly with regard
to the rapidly changing institutional
structure of collective action.
One case study site was located in
Xuan Thuy District in Nam Dinh
Province, an agricultural district on the
fringe of the Red River Delta in north-
ern Vietnam protected by artificial
dykes and, in part, mangrove forest.
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The quarterly bulletin, Tiempo , published by the International
Institute for Environment and Development (IIED, London, UK)
and the School of Environmental Sciences at the University of
East Anglia (UEA, Norwich, UK), aims to promote communica-
tion between the nations of the North and South on the issue of
climate change, to promote the interests of developing nations in
the climate debate and to provide authoritative and timely infor-
mation on relevant scientific, technical and policy matters.
In the words of the first editorial: “…to be effective, the flow of information [on climate change] must be in both direc-
tions. It is self-evident that the developing world must have access to timely and relevant information but it is equally
important that the industrialised nations be fully aware of the particular knowledge, aspirations and perspectives of the
South. It is hoped that the bulletin will provide a lively forum for debate as well as being a valuable source of informa-
tion”. 
The bulletin is distributed free on request to low-income subscribers. Contributions from higher-income subscribers will
enable expanded distribution. 
Email: m.kelly@uea.ac.uk; web: http://www.cru.uea.ac.uk/tiempo/.
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Estimates of the magnitude of impacts in Nam Dinh Province
from floods and typhoons for the twenty years between 1973
and 1992 show that there were more than 990 injured peo-
ple, including fatalities, and over VND 470 billion damage
(1993 constant prices) as a result of severe storms (VND =
Vietnam Dong; US$1 = VND 11,000). 
The agrarian economy of Vietnam operates through a formal
and sophisticated system of social security facilitated, even in
the post-collectivisation era, through local government insti-
tutions. Analysis of household survey data revealed the com-
plex mesh of factors which shape the vulnerability of a com-
munity as social and economic trends reinforce, transform or
weaken existing patterns of risk.
• Overall, Xuan Thuy is, in rural Vietnamese terms, a rela-
tively wealthy and productive district with a low incidence
of absolute poverty and might be considered, from this iso-
lated perspective, less vulnerable in the context of rural
Vietnam as a whole.
• Poorer households are particularly dependent on a nar-
rower range of resources and income sources and are
thus more vulnerable, in the context of the local popula-
tion, as they have reduced access to resources for coping
with extreme events, such as credit sources, and are more
reliant on activities such as salt-making which could poten-
tially experience a significant impact in the face of coastal
flooding (and other climate shifts such as an increase in
cloudiness). 
• The distribution of resources within the district is relatively
even compared to many agrarian societies, but is less
even than in other parts of rural Vietnam — underlying
inequality is increasing due to the emergence of capital-
intensive commercial activities, principally aquaculture, in
the period since market liberalisation.
• Finally, the increasing dependence on aquaculture is hav -
ing complex effects on levels of vulnerability - on the one
hand, it should increase the overall wealth of the district
with trickle-down effects benefiting the population as a
whole but, on the other hand, it is heightening levels of
inequality, as noted, and tying up capital in an inherently
risky venture (shrimp farms are seriously exposed to storm
impacts).
The parallel analysis of institutional issues reveals how
access to decision-making is a critical factor. For example,
there has been a reduction in the resources available for sea
dyke maintenance as monetarisation of the pre-
vious labour-based system has permitted the
diversion of finances away from dyke mainte-
nance and into, for example, road building in the
coastal communes, i.e. the development of
infrastructure to support economic growth. The
inland communes are not aware of this shift in
investment in collective security; they are per-
suaded by the coastal communes that the main-
tenance programme is being maintained at for-
mer levels and gives sufficient protection. In this
way, formal institutions are seeking to maintain
their resources, powers, and their authority in a
time of rapid change at the expense of collective
security.
The research has also shown that informal insti-
tutions have offset some of the negative conse-
quences of market liberalisation and the reduc-
tion of the role of government by evolving col-
lective security from below, for example,
through risk spreading in credit unions, particu-
larly in fishing communities.
What general lessons can be learnt from this
research regarding policy measures which
might reduce vulnerability and facilitate adapta-
tion? There are a number of strands that are of
wider applicability. These concern the promo-
tion of measures which would improve the situ-
ation of the poorer members of these and other
communities, the people we consider increas-
ingly at risk as a result of recent socio-political
trends.
• Poverty reduction clearly must be a priority,
though that alone may not be sufficient to
ensure the wider access to resources neces-
sary to reduce vulnerability.
• Risk-spreading through income diversifica-
tion can be promoted in a number of ways
and, again, will assist most the poorer mem-
bers of the community.
• The loss of common property management
rights represents a serious erosion of the
ability to resist stress and, where it cannot be
CLIMATE CHANGE
avoided, compensatory measures
should be implemented.
• F i n a l l y, the reduced eff i c i e n c y, or
loss, of forms of collective action or
investment affects the community as
a whole and this process warrants
careful monitoring with efforts to pro-
mote the development or resuscita-
tion of other, perhaps traditional,
forms of community security.
At a deeper level, the underlying caus-
es of vulnerability must be tackled if we
are to develop a sustainable response
to extreme events and climate change.
It will be necessary, for example, to
address directly the inequitable distri-
bution of resources — a substantial
challenge!
This article is based on a longer
account of the conclusions of this
research available from the authors.
Mick Kelly is based at the Climatic
Research Unit and Neil Adger at the
Centre for Social and Economic
Research on the Global Environment,
School of Environmental Sciences,
University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4
7TJ UK . e-mail: m.kelly@uea.ac.uk
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How should we act in the face of potential climate
change? And how should we think about this action?
A first line of thought starts with an impact assessment. In
logical sequence, it raises such questions as: what climatic
variations will be generated by an increase in greenhouse
gases in the atmosphere? What impact will these have on
various ecological systems around the world? How will these
ecological changes affect human activities, and eventually
people’s well-being? Finally, how can these effects be miti-
gated through appropriate policies?
An alternative approach starts with a vulnerability analysis,
particularly of groups historically affected by climatic pertur-
bations and disasters. This analysis puts the potential effects
of climate change within a more comprehensive picture,
encompassing the causes and circumstances of vulnerability
including the social determinants of vulnerability. This alter -
native is part of what we call the “sustainable livelihoods
approach to social justice”.
Before going deeper into conceptual considerations, it may
be useful to illustrate the difference between these two
approaches with a simple example. The single-issue
approach characteristic of the first line of thought may even-
tually lead to the establishment of international trading per-
mits for the regulation of emissions of CO2 gases, paving the
way for large transfers of resources from Northern to
Southern countries.
While this measure may reduce the emission of gases and
mitigate climate change adequately, it is actually unclear
what its effect on people’s vulnerability in many countries of
the South will actually be. For instance, it has been argued
that flows of international aid reduce the accountability of
governments to their people. We can easily imagine that the
possibility of selling emission rights might create a strong
incentive to take control over different states – possibly in
very undemocratic ways. Hence, a vulnerability analysis may
show that people are vulnerable, not only to climate change,
but also to bad politics, particularly as there are considerable
benefits to be won by those in control, such as oil fields, and
maybe in the future, emission rights. From this perspective,
adequate solutions are those which reduce the risks associ-
ated directly with climate change, without increasing those of
a social, political or economic nature. 
The sustainable livelihoods approach -
how does it relate to the debate on climate change?
Franck Amalric
The sustainable
livelihoods approach
To some extent the expression ‘sustainable
livelihoods’ has become a rallying flag for many
thinkers and activists in citizen groups. In
response to the failure of mainstream develop-
ment policies to alleviate poverty and to check
the escalation of the environmental crisis, these
groups have started to conceptualise and advo-
cate an alternative view of social justice based
on popular participation and social mobilisation.
This notion emphasises the creativity of the
poor and of local communities as the source of
well-being, cultural expression, and social
improvement.
Let us emphasise three basic features of this
approach.
Firstly, while development starts with a “national
problem”, and takes the existence of the nation
for granted, the sustainable livelihoods
approach starts from the point of view of men
and women living in rural areas of the South,
regardless of the country in which they might be
living. It is not, however, limited to the local
level. It builds on an analysis of people’s liveli-
hoods to make recommendations on how to
address issues at local and national levels. In
other words, strengthening people’s livelihoods
is not seen as a complementary strategy to
maximising economic growth or achieving good
governance; rather the analysis of people’s
livelihoods provides a basis on which to design
appropriate economic policies and institutional
structures. 
A second specific feature of the sustainable
livelihoods approach is its focus on agency
rather than on well-being. It emphasises the
need to create conditions within which people
can express their own power. This emphasis
draws our attention to the existence of political
spaces – i.e. possibilities for people to organise
themselves collectively in various ways – and to
p e o p l e ’s control over productive
resources, in particular natural
resources. Thus people, rather than
the state or unspecified market forces,
are the agents of society and of social
change.
The third feature, perhaps the most
controversial one, is the value given to
place. Not only is it important for people
to act now – the second feature – but it
is also for people to act where they are.
Attachment to a place is valued in part
because it is intrinsic to one’s identity
or one’s culture - a point strongly made
by indigenous people. This attachment
is valued for other reasons as well: for
instance, societies’ need to slow down
the process of urbanisation (for social,
economic, and environmental rea-
sons), to occupy the territory in an
appropriate manner, to nurture nature,
etc. 
When combined, these three features
give rise to a vision of societal transfor-
mation based on the strengthening,
regeneration, and defence of local
economies. This vision comprises:
• a significant degree of economic
self-reliance at the local level that
can act as a buffer against external
economic shocks;
• a reliance on traditional knowledge,
and indigenous and appropriate
technologies;
• the establishment of innovative
democratic forms of local gover-
nance;
• the strengthening or regeneration of
nature and of ecologically sound
forms of production and consump-
tion.
CLIMATE CHANGE
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Some differences between
sustainable development and
the sustainable livelihoods
approach
The sustainable livelihoods approach differs in many ways
from current theories of sustainable development inspired by
economic theory.
First, the sustainable livelihoods approach is based on a the-
ory of collective empowerment, and, unlike the economic
approach, is based on an analysis of some promising exper-
iments or “success stories” in rural areas of the South. By
contrast, the economic approach, while assigning a crucial
role to participation, civil society, and the generation of social
capital, lacks a theory of how participation is to come about,
how civil society is to be mobilised, and social capital to be
generated. Thus one of its key recommendations – that peo -
ple should participate in decision-making or project imple-
mentation – is not grounded in reality. Furthermore, it cannot
address the difficult question of the compatibility between
macro-economic policies and institutions on the one hand,
and bring about participation and the generation of social
capital on the other.
Secondly, while the sustainable livelihoods approach gives
central importance to location, economic theory completely
disregards geographical considerations.
A third difference concerns methodology. The economic
approach is theoretical in the sense that it starts from an a-
priori conception of human behaviour (homo oeconomicus).
The sustainable livelihoods approach, by contrast, starts
from existing innovative forms of governance, and tries to
imagine new societal arrangements from such vantage
points. For instance, the sustainable livelihoods approach
gives importance to the organisational form in which market
transactions are carried out. The difference between a co-
operative and a middleman system does not simply concern
the distribution of surplus – important as this may be – but it
also concerns how each organisation relates to other organ-
isations in the locality. Co-operatives may in general be sup-
portive of local democratic institutions, while middleman sys-
tems are rather conducive to quasi-feudal political systems.
These differences lead to a rejection by the sus-
tainable livelihoods approach of the economic
definition of sustainable development as the
optimal level of economic growth attainable
while keeping the stock of capital non-declining.
For instance, mobile financial capital and natu-
ral resources cannot be considered as two com-
parable forms of capital, as they relate in very
different ways to people’s livelihoods. 
Sustainable livelihoods
and climate change: an
example
For many people living in rural areas of the
South, the main impact of the oil-based global
economy is not the possible consequences of
global warming, but the costs associated with
the extraction and transport of oil and minerals.
It is the loss of livelihood due to oil exploration
and digging, to the pollution of land, water and
air caused by these operations, to the construc-
tion and protection of pipelines and ports, and to
the political struggles linked to oil and minerals. 
For example the construction of a pipeline
between Chad and Cameroon for the transport
of Chadian oil to the ocean has already led to
more than 100 deaths and a sharp rise in
human rights’ violations, as local communities
have been resisting against the project
in order to protect their land and liveli-
hoods. In Africa, 60% of foreign direct
investment is linked to oil exploitation
and mining. At the same time those
countries which rely most heavily on
mining and oil are also the ones with
the poorest record of human develop-
ment in the region – largely because of
bad politics.
What does this mean? That from a sus-
tainable livelihoods perspective, one
way to reduce emissions of CO2 and
reduce the vulnerability of people living
in rural areas of the South is to reduce
extraction of oil, and monitor closely
the action of oil companies. T h e r e
would of course be tremendous oppo-
sition to such a policy. But my intention
here was not to come up with a magic
solution. It was merely to illustrate how
the sustainable livelihoods approach
opens up new avenues for reflection
and debate.
Franck Amalric is part of the Ethics
Working Group and is based at the
Society for International Development,
Via Panisperna 207, 00184 Rome, Italy.
email: francka@sidint.org
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“Governance” is the idea that collective problem-solv -
ing, at all levels - from the local to the global - must
include not only governments but other players, includ -
ing the private sector and civil society . As such, gover-
nance means moving from behind-the-scenes lobbying of
politicians to taking responsibility for collaboratively, collec-
tively, and transparently solving public problems. So far, gov-
ernance mechanisms have been most successful at the local
level; it has been difficult to develop similar mechanisms at
national and global levels. This difficulty, particularly at the
global level, can be explained by the reluctance of govern-
ments to give up power, and of the private sector, particular-
ly transnational corporations (TNCs) to take responsibility for
the effect of their actions.
I would like to discuss here what “governance” might mean in
the area of global climate, first by arguing why the current
approach is flawed, secondly why a collective problem-solv-
ing approach is required, and thirdly by proposing such an
approach, though this will be done at a purely conceptual and
theoretical level.
Indeed, climate change is a typical area where governance
mechanisms, so far, do not apply. The Climate Convention,
like most other international environmental agreements, is
considered to be mainly the business of governments. It is
the governments who are Parties to the Convention, and it is
again the governments who “will seek to achieve its [the
Convention’s] ultimate objective of stabilizing greenhouse
gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would
prevent dangerous anthropogenic [human-made] interfer-
ence with the climate system” (from official leaflet).
Consequently, it is the governments who 1) inform about the
What the concept of “governance” can do 
to mitigate climate change
Matthias Finger
quantities of greenhouse gases that they (sic!)
emit, and about their national sinks, 2) carry out
national programmes for mitigating climate
change, and 3) will ultimately have to meet the
ridiculously low targets set in the Kyoto
Protocol. As a result of this government-centric
approach, lobbyists from all walks of life, from
TNCs to NGOs, seek to convince governments
that their interests are identical to the national
interest. Toothless accords and flawed protocols
with innumerable loopholes profiting various
lobbyists (e.g., in the case of climate change
clauses such as “emissions trading”, “emissions
banking”, “joint implementation”, and inclusion
of “carbon sinks”) are the direct outcome of this
approach.  It is an approach which is not likely
to get us very far, be it in the areas of climate
change, biodiversity, or other global environ-
mental problems.
The problem here is that the Nation-States are
treated as sovereign players in addressing cli-
mate change, while they have done almost
everything in their power to abandon their con-
trol over one of the key drivers of greenhouse
gas emissions - trade. Indeed, over the past 20
years they have liberalised trade, deregulated
industries such as oil production, airlines, trans-
portation, energy, and privatised their public
enterprises, all which have significantly con-
tributed to world GDP. As a result, world trade,
according to UNCTAD’s most recent figures,
has increased by 9% in 1995, by 5% in 1996,
and again by 9% in 1997. Not sur-
p r i s i n g l y, greenhouse gas emis-
sions increase in about the same
proportions, though figures are
harder to come by. As a result, the
only players still in some control of
trade flows are TNCs, as approxi-
mately half of today’s world trade
is said to be intra-firm trade.
Indeed, it would probably be more
logical to ask TNCs to have direct
control of greenhouse gas emis-
sions, at least the trade-related
emissions, rather than ask govern-
ments to impose such restrictions upon
TNCs. But even if one adopts a more
conservative, i.e. GDP-based rather
than trade-flow based approach, one
comes to the inescapable conclusion
that TNCs must play a more active role
in mitigating climate change. Indeed, if
one considers that GDPis almost total-
ly correlated with fossil fuel consump-
tion, and that among the world’s 100
biggest economies approximately half
are TNCs, at least half of the Parties to
any Convention on Climate Change will
have to be TNCs.
The idea of governance as applied to
the argument above will mean that
TNCs will have to take direct responsi-
bility for reducing greenhouse gas
emissions, rather than hiding behind
governments. Indeed, in the traditional
government-centric approach, states
would ideally commit themselves to tar-
gets, while trying to get TNCs to agree
to share the burden. However, the
loopholes mentioned above make it
impossible for governments to pin them
down. Consequently a governance
system would have to be set up where-
by TNCs are direct parties to a conven-
tion, and this in proportion to their actu-
al contribution to the greenhouse
effect.  A corresponding governance
mechanism, probably of a regulatory
nature, would have to be set up so that
compliance could be ensured and
enforced. If one admits that a signifi-
cant proportion of greenhouse gas
emissions are trade-related, it might be
conceivable to put such compliance
and enforcement mechanisms into the
hands of a trade regulator. This could
be the WTO, if it is to move in the direc-
tion of trade regulation.
Matthias Finger is Chair of the Working
Group on Governance
CLIMATE CHANGE
Greenhouse gas emissions increase in about the same proportion as the
growth of world trade
Policy Matters ............13
We are facing today the crisis of species loss, the crisis
of our increasingly unstable climate and the financial cri -
sis centring on the instability and inequity of the global
economy . In addressing those three interrelated crises, the
axis of climate and energy policy seems to offer the most
direct and tangible opportunity for integrated action. 
Last summer, a group of 16 economists, energy company
presidents, scientists and policy experts, meeting at the
Center for Health and the Global Environment at Harvard
Medical School, worked out a set of strategies to begin to
reverse the warming-driven destabilisation of our climate.
The members of the group are united by their impatience with
the pace and reach of the Kyoto process and with what it
believes is an unrealistic reliance on flexibility mechanisms –
especially “cap-and-trade” and “Joint Implementations” – as
an instrument for international emissions reduction, especial-
ly in the near-term. 
The strategies embodied in the World Energy
Modernization Plan, which emerged from those dis-
cussions are designed, to begin to restore order to
the currently unstable global economy as well as to
relieve pressure on natural habitats, especially in
the developing world. 
The plan is driven by the unambiguous scientific
finding of more than 2,000 scientists from 100
countries reporting to the United Nations that to
ensure a hospitable climate ultimately requires
emissions reductions of from 60 to 80 percent. That means
essentially rewiring the globe and replacing our oil-burning
furnaces, coal-burning generating plants and gasoline-pow-
ered cars with renewable and highly efficient energy tech-
nologies. 
What nature requires, in short, is ultimately a global energy
transition to re-stabilise the climate and allow ecological sys-
tems to readjust. That transition requires both the decarbon-
isation of energy supplies by the major multi-national energy
companies in the North as well as the transfer of renewable
and high-efficiency energy technologies to the developing
nations. 
A major premise of the plan involves the impact of a global
energy transition on the global economy. Contrary to the
economically defensive posture of many nations and indus-
Towards a global energy transition
Ross Gelbspan
tries, we believe a transition to renewable and
h i g h - e fficiency sources would substantially
expand the stability, equity and total wealth in
the global economy. It would allow every nation-
al economy to develop without regard to atmo-
spheric limits. We believe it would raise living
standards in the developing nations without
compromising economic achievements in the
North. 
Insofar as the plan is as much an instrument of
development as carbon reduction, it should
have a stabilising effect on the reduction of
species diversity. By creating clean energy, it
should eventually mitigate impacts of climate
change on species loss. By creating jobs –
especially in the poor areas – it should con-
tribute to a reduction of habitat destruction
through destructive land-use patterns. By
reducing and ultimately eliminating expendi-
tures for imported fossil fuels, it should relieve
the pressure on land resources from cash crop
monocultures which is driven, in part, by the
need to pay for imported fossil fuels. Hopefully,
by enhancing economic security, it would con-
tribute to the stabilisation of population levels. 
The impacts of climate change are emerging
quickly and intensely. The build-up of atmo-
spheric carbon from our burning of fossil fuels
has been accompanied by a relentless succes-
sion of extreme weather events whose costs are
escalating at a frightening rate.
In 1998 alone, we saw a crippling ice
storm in Quebec and New England,
uncontrolled fires in Brazil, Mexico and
Florida, killer heat waves in the Middle
East, Texas and India, Mexico’s worst
drought in 70 years followed by intense
floods, massive flooding in China which
left 14 million people homeless, the
worst flood in the history of Bangladesh
which left 30 million people without
homes, extensive drought in Vietnam
and the 11,000 hurricane casualties in
Central America. The year surpassed
1997 as the hottest year in recorded
history - and at least the hottest year in
this millennium. 
Most alarming is the accel-
erating rate of climate
change. As recently as five
years ago, most climate sci -
entists said they expected to
see significant signs of cli-
mate change in the middle
of the next century. Now
they are seeing those signs
today.
The financial consequences
of this accelerating frequen-
cy of extreme weather events are high-
lighted in the escalating losses to the
property insurance industry. While
insurance losses from extreme weath-
er events averaged $2 billion a year in
the 1980s, they are averaging $12 bil-
lion in the 1990s. In fact, the insurance
losses of 1998 alone exceed all such
losses from the previous decade. 
Given the inertia and resistance in the
UN-sponsored climate negotiations,
the challenge of a global energy transi-
tion seems at first glance overwhelm-
ing. But the crisis facing the world’s
capital markets makes the project more
feasible — since it could well provide a
CLIMATE CHANGE
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mechanism for stabilising both the global economy and the
global climate. 
The “solution” as we see it involves three interactive and self-
reinforcing strategies to begin to address the climate crisis. 
The first involves a change in subsidy policies. Today the
U.S. government spends about $20 billion each year subsi-
dising fossil fuels. Globally, that figure is estimated at $300
billion. If those fossil fuel subsidies were withdrawn, it would
result in more accurate fuel prices which would reduce
excessive oil and coal consumption. The establishment of
equivalent subsidies for renewable energy sources would
provide major incentives for the world’s energy companies to
invest in fuel cells and solar, photovoltaic, biomass and wind
power. Those incentives should provide the necessary boost
to propel renewable energy into the big league of global
industry. (At the same time, a portion of those subsidies
should be used to retrain displaced coal miners and other
fossil fuel workers.) 
The second strategy involves the adoption of progressively
more stringent Fossil Fuel Efficiency and Renewable Content
standards - together with the elimination of regulations which
support inefficient monopoly utilities and wasteful energy use. 
While a normal coal-fired generating plant, for example,
achieves about 35 percent efficiency, a high-efficiency gas-
fired cogeneration facility achieves from 75 to 90 percent effi-
ciency. Improved efficiencies are available in transportation,
industry and household and commercial equipment. The
institution of progressive efficiency and renewable standards
in the developed nations — and the elimination or moderni-
sation of regulatory barriers and protections — would
strengthen energy competition based on the criteria of effi-
ciency and price. 
We believe these two elements - a change in subsidy policies
as well as the institution of efficiency and renewable stan-
dards in tandem with the elimination of regulatory barriers to
competition - would be enough to initiate an energy transition
in the industrial world. 
The adoption of similar standards by the developing nations
as well would create an immediate worldwide market for
renewable energy. If each nation - beginning at its current
baseline - were to commit to increasing its fossil fuel efficien-
cy by specified rates at designated intervals,
that would also defuse the current North-South
impasse over the fundamental equity question
which lies at the centre of the dispute over the
emissions “cap-and-trade” regime envisioned in
the Kyoto Protocol. 
Even if the countries of the North were to
reduce their emissions dramatically, however,
that cut would be overwhelmed by the coming
pulse of carbon from China, India, Mexico,
Brazil and all the other developing nations who
are trying to stay ahead of the undertow of
chronic poverty.
For that reason, the third element of the plan
involves the transfer of technology and exper-
tise to promote renewable and efficient energy
sources in the developing world. Virtually all
developing nations would be happy to switch to
solar, wind and fuel-cell power. Virtually none is
able to afford an energy transition on its own. 
One vehicle for financing that transition is a tax
on all international currency transactions. Those
transactions today total about $1.3 trillion per
day. A quarter-of-a-penny tax (per US dollar) on
those transactions would yield about $200 bil-
lion a year (after other costs) to build windmill
factories in India, solar assemblies in El
Salvador, cogeneration plants in South Africa
and fuel cell factories in Russia. 
This tax was initially conceived by Dr. James
Tobin, a Nobel Prize-winning economist, as a
method of stabilising international capital flows.
Of all the various tax systems that have been
proposed, a tax on currency transactions seems
to be the most equitable, non-discriminatory
and broad-based. It could provide sufficient rev-
enues for the energy transition in developing
countries without eroding its own financial base. 
But other funding sources with comparable rev-
enue-raising potential exist, e.g., taxes on car-
bon-based fuels, diversion of those portions of
defence budgets dedicated to protecting the
security of oil commerce, and other
revenue-raising mechanisms. 
However it is financed, we believe a
global public works programme
financed by a World Energy
Modernization Fund, may hold the
same potential benefits for today’s
global economy that the New Deal poli-
cies held for the U.S. economy in the
1930s.
A worldwide energy transition would
create millions of jobs all over the
world. It would go far toward reversing
the widening economic gap between
North and South. And, in short order,
the renewable energy industry would
become the central, driving engine of
growth of the global economy.
The resulting global economic order
would, we believe, resemble the econ-
omy of Western Europe after the imple-
mentation of the Marshall Plan. Today,
instead of a collection of dependent
and impoverished allies, the United
States enjoys robust trade with its
European partners. We believe a
worldwide energy transition would gal-
vanise the global economy in much the
same way.
Without such a transition, however, the
outlook is frightening and depressing.
The accelerating changes to the global
climate - with its alteration of El Nino
patterns, the die-off of the A l a s k a n
forests, the disintegration of Antarctic
ice shelves, the northward migration of
infectious diseases and the continuing
succession of severe storms, altered
drought and rainfall patterns and tem-
perature extremes - will do more than
tear holes in the global economic fab-
ric. It may well prove the undoing of our
organised civilisation. 
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A fair share: Demanding entitlements for an equitable and
sustainable climate regime
Shaheen Rafi Khan
A week before the COP4 to the Framework Convention
on Climate Change took place in Buenos Aires, the
Centre for Science and Environment (CSE), India, held a
conference entitled “A Fair Share: demanding entitle -
ments for an equitable and sustainable climate regime”.
Attended by participants from Bangladesh, Sri Lanka,
Nepal, India and Pakistan, the conference started with
the premise that the covenants of the Kyoto Protocol
were not only iniquitous, but contained in-built perverse
incentives to pollute. 
Shaheen Rafi Khan of SDPI, Pakistan, reports on the
alternative position proposed by CSE which, he argues,
could become the basis for a unified Southern negoti-
ating stance – “provided the South can get its act
t o g e t h e r ” .
The Annex 1 (developed countries) and transition economies
have been apportioned entitlements to pollute the environ-
ment. These entitlements are implicit in their national com-
mitments to lower emissions, (which amounts to a global
5.2% below the base year (1990) by the year 2010). In other
words, their combined emissions - minus 5.2 percent – would
become frozen in perpetuity. In this manner, not only will
northern countries have legitimised their dismal historical
record in polluting the planet but, in addition, will claim credit
for doing their bit for global warming to boot.
Let’s look at the national commitments a bit more closely.
Australia was a high emitter in the early nineties as a result
of uncontrolled deforestation. Since then, it has reduced
emissions steadily as a result of better forestry practices,
actually lowering such emissions by more than required in
the KP. So now it actually ends up with an entitlement to
increase its emissions by a whopping 8%. The arbitrary
choice of the base year also benefits the transition
economies, which have been in a slump ever since the early
nineties. Although committing itself to a zero reduction,
Russia has, in effect, got itself a 30% emission margin – a
gratuitous windfall generated by recession related emission
reductions.
The U.S., of course, gets tremendous mileage out of this. It
is gearing up to trade away a chunk of its emission reduction
requirements with Russia for a relative pittance (estimated at
$15 billion on the basis of an established price per tonne of
carbon sequestered). Russia just has to twiddle its thumbs to
get this nice little windfall. In addition, its margin will not be
traded away for some time because of new
emission control technologies on the shelf. The
global targets of the KP will have been met but
the developed countries will have done nothing
to actually reduce emissions. They will just have
traded ‘hot air’ – a case of concrete action
become hostage to creative accounting.
Why then, might one ask, does the U.S. insist
upon ‘meaningful participation’ by the develop-
ing countries (China, India) when the ‘hot air’
option exists? The answer is caps. The U.S. can
only trade away a proportion of its commit-
ments; the rest has to be meaningful reductions.
That is where the developing countries come in.
By committing them to reduce, the global bur-
den gets distributed more widely and national
requirements get reduced commensurately.
Conceivably, the South may not agree. Why
should it be deprived of its bit of atmospheric
space when the North has been carving huge
chunks out of it ever since its factories began to
belch out smoke? Just look at existing patterns
of emission. The emissions of one American
(this is the good part) are equal to those of 25
Indians, 33 Pakistanis, 42 Maldivians, 85 Sri
Lankans, 125 Bangladeshis, 250 Bhutanese
and 500 Nepalis, with such emissions having a
direct correlation with growth/development. Not
surprisingly, the South too would want its place
in the sun, and if global warming is to be the
price, so be it.
The North has an answer to this, in the form of
a neat little neo-classical ploy. Starting out as
Joint Implementation (JI), this has evolved into
Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) – the
latter makes the obligatory nod to sustainable
development. Basically it allows developed
countries to buy certified emission reduction
units (invest in carbon-efficient projects) from
low emission countries. CSE refers to these as
‘Unclean Development Mechanisms’.
Here’s why. An elaborate market-driven mecha-
nism is being proffered to lure developing coun-
tries into selling off their emission rights at dirt-
cheap prices. At the apex would be a
global executive board to oversee such
trading. The board, in turn, would
authorise numerous certification agen-
cies to assess compliance of the coun-
tries selling the emission reduction
units. Multilateral institutions and banks
are scrambling for a slice of the broker-
age. The World Bank wants to corner
the market with its Carbon Investment
Fund; The Asian Development Bank is
developing a portfolio of projects of
interest (does anyone remember
ALGAS)? UNDP, GEF, UNCTAD – all
want a piece of the action.
Multinationals too can enter into deals.
Ostensibly market-driven, the pro-
posed arrangements are designed to
prod developing countries into cut-
throat competition for funds. The race
has already begun with low cost
options being identified and submitted
for funding. Projects priced as low as
$14 per tonne of carbon reduced are
being offered, compared to the aver-
age $125 per tonne it costs to reduce in
the U.S. Seen this way, there is nothing
clean in the mechanisms proposed.
They are just a means to ensure that
the industrialised countries meet their
emission reduction targets without
actually lowering their own emissions –
and at the lowest possible cost. Worse
still, developing countries will have
bartered away their low-cost options,
leaving future generations with the bur-
den of implementing the most expen-
sive cost options by the time they
become subject to mandatory emission
reductions – as they surely must,
thanks to lack of effective compliance
by the North. The KP purports to be a
benign environmental agreement.
From the South’s perspective it is a
pernicious trading agreement.
Furthermore, are such mechanisms
viable? Not according to CSE. As men-
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tioned, the South will be forced into commitments as volun-
tary and traded compliance measures prove inadequate sub-
stitutes for real reductions by the North. The closer it
approaches such commitments, the more reluctant will it be
to subscribe to voluntary measures. After all, it will want to
look good on the global map. And it certainly won’t accom-
plish this by becoming so energy efficient that by the time
baselines are set for it, its energy conservation efforts have
made high percentage reductions difficult. So much easier to
go on polluting and achieve both easy and substantive reduc-
tions from a high base. Thus the strategy spelt out in the KP
provides non-Annex 1 countries with a perverse incentive to
continue with their current rate of emissions. 
What is the most equitable and
effective strategy?
Interventions premised on market mechanisms without asso-
ciated property rights or entitlements are clearly iniquitous,
mortgage the future interests of the South and are ineffective
in controlling emissions. The solution is simple – institute
such rights. How can this be done? By distributing budgeted
emissions equally. Budgeted emissions are the difference
between the optimum required for carbon dioxide stabilisa-
tion and current emission levels. This difference should be
divided equally on a per capita basis. All countries must
commit themselves to reaching the determined per capita
level (this is subject to scientific re-evaluation) also known as
the principle of convergence. The merit in this is that secure
tenure rights (to the atmosphere) would create a level playing
field for emissions trading.
Let’s see how it works. Say the budgeted (allowable) emis-
sions are 1 tonne of carbon per capita. And say the South
presently emits 0.1 tonnes per capita while the North is clos-
er to 2 tonnes per capita. The North has to cut its emissions
by 1 tonne per capita while the South has the option of going
up by 0.9 tonnes per capita. It will do so up to a point because
it must grow. But beyond that it can trade its surplus.
However, there is no longer any compulsion to go for its low-
est cost options – for instance, planting trees because land
and labour are cheap. With inalienable entitlements, each
country can determine the price and choice of option. In fact,
if the negotiated price is high enough, there could be suffi-
cient incentive to go for a solar transition, with the relatively
higher cost over carbon technology being offset by this price
subsidy. Furthermore, enough demand can, conceivably, be
generated in the South to give an impetus to
Northern R&D to invest in solar energy cost
reductions. Distributional benefits are implicit in
the solar transition, in as much as it would elec-
trify rural communities presently off the grid.
Is this a pipe dream?
Definitely not, but there are constraints, which
must be recognised and addressed. First, the
North will not give away its emission privileges
easily, especially when it has to come down to
a budgeted per capita figure from its present
high emission levels. Recriminations, to the
effect that the North has polluted the planet
criminally, will not help. At best, the South can
use this to take the moral high ground and set-
tle for phased emission reductions. The North
can also argue in reverse that per capita enti-
tlements are unfair because the South is demo-
graphically rampant. Easily resolved. The glob-
al population level can be frozen in time – a
much more credible recourse than the arbitrary
choice of the baseline. Ultimately there is a flip
side to this, in as much as equity is, potentially,
a convincing rallying point for the South.
Second, the South is divided. While there are
certain NGOs, such as CSE which have gone to
the source of the problem to come up with a
common philosophical premise, the majority of
Southern institutions – NGOs, governments,
the private sector – have either succumbed to
Northern blandishments or slotted in for per-
sonal gain. At best, Southern governments are
ill-informed and barter away concessions
unknowingly. It has become a standing joke that
briefs are hastily prepared for the government
by local think tanks and one, or at most two,
favoured individuals go jetting off to the major
conferences sit mutely through the discussions
and are neither seen nor heard from afterwards.
By the same token, some countries subscribe
to voluntary compliance. But the worst sell-out
is when non-profit and private sector entities get
on to the northern wavelength for personal gain.
Third, the existing KP m e c h a n i s m s
could engender misplaced concrete-
ness. What developing countries may
be compelled to do because their cities
are becoming uninhabitable, may be
subverted by climate change impera-
tives, specifically by the lure of the
proverbial pot of gold. A transition to an
entitlements-based regime can ensure
the convergence of both imperatives.
What needs to be
done
A consensus needs to be built up
through effective advocacy. T h e
Southern Asian Atmospheric Group set
up by CSE, with a core group of mem-
bers from India, Sri Lanka,
Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan, is a
step in this direction. The Group has
formulated a statement of shared con-
cern which it will disseminate among
member countries. Other activities
planned are:
• Identify groups working on equity
and natural resources and link them
to climate and equity
• Circulate the shared statement of
concern to all members of the South
Asian Climate Action Network
(CAN).
• Create a website page in the name
of the atmospheric group and link
with other websites
• Commission work on folk
wisdom/oral history on climate
regimes in the region
• Work towards organising a confer-
ence on impacts
• Prepare fact sheets in other lan-
guages.
Any other ideas most welcome.
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The notion of capacity building has received significant
attention in recent years, mainly in the context of nation -
al development and environmental management. It is now
well understood that capacity is required to meet a variety of
challenges in these domains — for example, Agenda 21 sug-
gests that the “fundamental goal of capacity building is to
enhance the ability to evaluate policy choices and modes of
implementation of development options, based on an under-
standing of environmental resources and their limits, and of
specific needs as perceived by the people of the country con-
cerned.” [United Nations 1992] 
Most of the discussion surrounding capacity building focuses
on improved management for development and of the envi-
ronment on the national level through strengthened human
resources, improved institutions and inter-institutional link-
ages, and the creation of an enabling policy environment
(see, for example, UNDP1997 and OECD 1995). Less atten-
tion has been devoted to issues surrounding capacity build-
ing for global environmental issues, i.e., what kind of capaci-
ty is needed, towards what goals does it need to be
deployed, and how it may be built up. The discussions on this
front are still relatively general in nature, and there is not
much literature on the topic. Still, there are characteristics of
global environmental issues which suggest that the capacity
to identify, understand and tackle local or national environ-
mental issues may be different from the capacity to deal with
environmental problems that are global in origin, and need
global solutions.
Ecological, economic, and social implications of global envi-
ronmental issues such as climate change are expected to
vary substantially among regions and nations. This variation
results, on the one hand, from the geographic distribution of
the diverse impacts (since the manifestation of the impacts is
often dependent on local geography, ecology, and economy),
and, on the other hand, from differences in mitigation and
adaptation strategies of individual countries, and in how
these strategies are carried out under greatly differing socio-
economic conditions. While the phenomenon may be global
in origin, it is the impacts at the local level that will determine
the actual seriousness of the problem; at the same time, the
implementation of any strategy to tackle the problem must
also take place at the local level. 
In the case of climate change, for example, the effect of sea-
level rise is likely to affect countries very differently — small
Capacity building and climate change: 
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island states may suffer serious consequences
(some of them may be completely inundated) as
might low-lying coastal areas such as in
Bangladesh. But within these and other poten-
tially affected countries, the impact that may be
suffered will depend greatly on the nature of the
local ecology and economy. While computer
models may be able to suggest the range of
sea-level changes that could occur, only micro-
level studies that take into account the specifics
of local communities and their dependence on
the coastal ecosystems can provide insights
into the eventual socio-economic impacts and
possible mitigation strategies [Asthana 1997].
As another example, the impacts of global
changes in rainfall patterns on agriculture will be
determined by the manifestations of these
changes at the local level as well as the farming
conditions (the nature of the soil, groundwater
or surface water availability, etc.) and cropping
patterns there. Once again, this requires studies
at the appropriate scale. Therefore, a wide
range of inputs — data, analysis, and perspec-
tives — at different levels of detail and scale,
within and across nations, are key to informing
research and shaping coverage of the multitude
of issues [Kandlikar and Sagar 1999]. This
requires capacity not only to collect data and
other information within countries of the South,
but also the capacity to use this knowledge to
improve the models that form the basis of our
understanding about the climate systems and
its perturbations. 
A better understanding and definition of the
nature of the problem, of course, is only the first
step towards its resolution. Other steps include
the determination and presentation of policy
alternatives, selection of an acceptable set of
solutions by decisionmakers, and implementa-
tion (which may also require agreement on
appropriate methods for verification and moni-
toring of national compliance). Such steps
involve, inter alia, negotiations among countries
of highly complex issues. Such negotiations
require the ability to understand and articulate
national needs and concerns, to bring these
onto the international agenda, and then
being able to support and propagate
national positions through targeted
analysis. The capacity to do this once
again must reside within individual
nations (or at least among groups of
nations with similar interests).
All in all, in a broad cut, one can think
of multiple kinds of capacity required
for meeting the objectives of the FCCC.
These include:
• scientific and analytical capability to
understand the bio-geophysical
impacts of climate change and their
implications for national economies
and societies, 
• capability to generate possible tech-
nological and other policy alterna-
tives, as well as to analyse their
applicability in various national con-
texts and their implications for
national economies and societies,
• the utilisation of the above knowl-
edge to assist national decision-
makers in articulating and protecting
the national interest in the negotia-
tions under the climate convention,
• developing management capacity
for implementation of possible cli-
mate protection strategies.
This menu of requirements suggests
that capacities should perhaps be tai-
lored to the needs of the different coun-
tries, in line with their scientific, techni-
cal, and economic capabilities. Clearly
some kinds of capacity in one country
may be able to substitute for capacity in
another country — for example, the
results of a GCM model from Germany
may not be very different from that of a
model from the UK (assuming the
same availability of information to both
modelling groups). The applicability
and acceptability of policy models,
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however, may vary greatly across coun-
tries. Therefore economic analysis in the
North that assumes different valuation of
life for rich and poor countries may not res-
onate in the South (as was the case for the
IPCC SAR, resulting in a major controver-
sy). Such differences may be, in part,
because the identification of, the focus on,
and the eventual approaches to issues that
are deemed relevant may be determined
by analysts’ backgrounds. The predomi-
nance of Northern economic and policy
analysts in the climate debate has led to an
overwhelming emphasis on economic effi-
ciency at the expense, many in the South
feel, of equity considerations. Similarly,
some issues - for example, insurance or
liability for future climate impacts that is of
great interest to AOSIS countries - barely
register in international policy discussions. 
Most of the discussions on capacity building in the climate
issue have focused on the South, and on scientific and tech-
nical areas, i.e., the first (and to some extent, the second) of
the above bullet points. There has been almost no attention
paid, in comparison, to policy research and strengthening
linkages between science and policy research and decision-
making in developing countries. At the same time, what kind
of Northern capacity may be needed to assist in a resolution
of the climate debate in an equitable manner also remains an
open question.
Capacity building in the South
Most countries of the South will need to build substantial
capacity to deal with the climate issue. According to
Ohiorhenuan and Wunker (1995), this requires three levels of
capacity building for developing countries:
• capacity for compiling information regularly and identifying
appropriate measures (in line with Article 12);
• capacity to develop and implement strategies and pro-
grams (in line with Article 4);
• scientific research and the development and adaptation of
appropriate technologi0es. 
While the first element is being covered to some
extent by current capacity building efforts such
as the U.S. and UNEP Country Studies
Program as well as Global Environmental
Facility, the latter two elements are more difficult
to manage since they require more sophisticat-
ed forms of capacity and training that cannot be
transferred as easily, and can be built up only
slowly over a period of time. Still, there is some
effort to build up scientific research capacity in
the South through programs such as START
(System for Analysis, Research and Training)
and APN (Asia-Pacific Network)). 
Broadly speaking, though, one could say that in
most developing countries, most of the capacity
on the climate issue derives from the need to
fulfil specific obligations under the FCCC. In
addition to this, though, some developing coun-
tries do have scientific research efforts to better
understand the national implications of climate
change. Strengthening and upgrading this
capacity is an urgent task for developing coun-
tries, as is also the capacity to design and man-
age GHG abatement programs that are likely to
result from a climate regime. 
At the same time, as sug-
gested earlier, there is a crit-
ical need for Southern
capacity for strategic policy
analysis. Issues of justice
and equity have rarely
played a sustained role in
international relations —
bringing these concepts to
the table in the context of
global environmental prob-
lems is a difficult task. The
successful integration of
such principles into the
emerging climate regime in
turn is contingent on the abil-
ity of vulnerable nations to
gain a voice. In fact, for
many countries of the South,
a central element of the cli-
mate debate revolves
around the need for a fair resolution of
contentious questions such as who
should reduce GHG emissions and by
how much, and who should pay for
these reductions. Even the most rudi-
mentary national policy towards cli-
mate change requires an assessment
of the national and sub-national impli-
cations of the impacts of climate
change and of proposed abatement
strategies in the context of historical
GHG-emitting activities. 
Countries therefore need to develop a
clear understanding of why the climate
issue is important for them, and what
implication alternative scenarios would
have for their national economies.
Since such assessment requires a
whole range of skills — data collection,
data analysis, emissions scenarios, cli-
mate modelling, impact analysis, and
technical and economic analysis of
abatement strategies — a national
assessment capability requires both
building such skills in all, or most, of
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these areas, and having the ability to co-ordinate and utilise
these skills to inform the policymakers who may then use the
knowledge generated in domestic policy formulation and
international negotiations.1 As things now stand, most devel-
oping countries do not have the capacity to engage in such
assessments, and most are unlikely to be able to develop it.
Climate programs in developing countries are orders of mag-
nitude smaller than those in industrialised countries. For
example, the Indian Climate Research Program has a five-
year budget of $2.5 million, while the U.S. Global Change
Research Program devotes over two-thirds of its $1.8 billion
annual budget on climate-change-related research. Overall,
we estimate that the annual climate change research bud-
gets of the U.S., Japan, and E.U. member countries probably
add up to more than $ 3 billion.
Creative solutions are called for to overcome such con-
straints. To some extent these have already been forthcom-
ing — for example, non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
in developing countries use their networks with their counter-
parts and other institutions in the South and the North to stay
abreast of the latest developments in the climate issue, to
develop analyses that represent Southern positions, and pro-
ject Southern concerns in the international negotiating arena.
And Southern countries also use groups such as the G-
77/China to jointly present their views and concerns in the cli-
mate negotiations. An area of additional strength that has not
been explored as much yet is the role of Southern co-opera-
tion in the area of assessment and analysis. Donor agencies
have not shown much interest in this area - bilateral donors,
as is common with most aid programs, often require the util-
isation of their national consultants and institutions which
leads to North-South collaborations and linkages rather than
South-South exchanges. It may be possible for countries
such as India and China to take the lead on this front with
support from multilateral agencies. This may also be relevant
for areas of technology development and adaptation, as has
been pointed out elsewhere [Thomas 1998]
Capacity building in the North
Most discussions of capacity building for the climate issue
focus on developing countries that clearly lack capacity on
many fronts, but there is often also the implication that the
North already has the appropriate capacity to deal with the
climate issue (or at least has the capacity to assess what
capacity is needed).2 But certain kinds of capacity, currently
in short supply even in the North, may be useful
to build up. For example, capacity for informa-
tion dissemination to the public to improve the
public dialog on the climate issue could be
strengthened. In fact, mobilising public concern
is particularly important since tackling the cli-
mate problem will necessarily require significant
changes in modes of Northern economic activi-
ty and possibly consumption patterns. At the
same time, there are media campaigns that
downplay the risks from climate change (this is
applicable mainly in the US where, for example,
an industry coalition spent $13 million on a cam-
paign before COP3 to persuade the public that
developing countries should not get a “free ride”
at Kyoto, i.e., the US should not sign any
Protocol that did not include developing coun-
tries). Recognising the need for such capacity,
some institutions have launched efforts to
address this shortcoming - for example, the Pew
Center on Global Climate Change, established
by the Pew Charitable Trusts in 1998 focuses on
the education of the public on the risks, chal-
lenges and solutions to climate change. In fact,
it may be important to persuade the public that
climate and other global environmental issues
should be treated differently from strategic
issues such as national security or economic
competitiveness. Given the current propensity of
politicians to treat climate change as an issue on
which national interest should override global
concerns (despite the rhetoric to the contrary),
an atmosphere of distrust characterises the
negotiations. In reality, it is unlikely that the costs
of abatement in the North will be as high as
some pessimistic scenarios suggest. 
In addition, North-South research co-operation
may be very useful to understand Southern per-
spectives and needs. While North-South co-
operation often takes the form of developing
country researchers going to industrialised
countries, there may be an important role for the
reverse whereby researchers and analysts from
industrialised countries go to developing coun-
tries for extended periods to immerse them-
selves in the context that they purport to study
and work with local researchers in local
institutions under local conditions. This
will surely help them better appreciate
the constraints of doing research in the
South, and be exposed to the complex-
ities of perspectives, needs, and con-
cerns relating to global environmental
issues in relation to the economic and
social realities faced by the South. 
Northern donor programs are often
focused on specific issues driven by
donor interests - this can lead, for
example, to situations where multiple
donors may fund similar projects or, in
other cases, some may sponsor stud-
ies and workshops that reflect Northern
interests rather than a genuine desire
to assist the South in developing its
own perspectives. Since donors play a
critical role in building capacity in the
South, it is crucial that they themselves
have the capability to assess the
capacity gaps in these countries and
orient programs accordingly. Towards
this end, a broader range of inputs from
various participants in developing
countries may be desirable to identify
local needs, and similarly it may be
important to fund an assortment of
organisations such that long-term
diversity in perspectives is maintained.
In addition, in this era of dwindling
donor resources, donor co-operation
may be desirable.
Capacity building in
international 
science and policy
institutions
The complexity and uncertainty associ-
ated with most global environmental
problems calls for heavy emphasis on
scientific assessment, and analysis.
But scientists do not illuminate, inform,
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and make recommendations in a vacuum — the conduct of
science is shaped by politics and culture and the national ori-
gin of the analyst matters [Jasanoff 1998].3 If science and
analysis are shaped by societal and cultural variables, as
social studies perspective on the creation and use of knowl-
edge suggest, then it seems imperative that a multiplicity of
voices from different countries and cultures is essential to illu-
minating the range of perspectives that shape the science,
knowledge, and analysis relevant to the climate debate. 
Yet uneven participation in the IPCC, the authoritative inter-
governmental panel that seeks to provide a state-of-the-art
review of issues in the climate debate to the global commu-
nity, is well known. Developed country experts far outnumber
participants from developing countries, and there seems no
objective criteria for selection of participants. In fact, the
selection process is arcane for the participants themselves
(personal conversation with participants for the TAR suggests
that this is still the case - personal connections and networks
often seem to determine invitations for participation). While
the TAR has made attempts to increase developing country
participation, there is not much effort at understanding fun-
damental reasons for the biased membership and hence of
possible ways of redressing the discrimination. This, of
course, holds not just for the IPCC but for other international
scientific research programs also - for example, the formation
and implementation of the major international scientific pro-
grams (IGBP, WCRP, and IHDP), has been dominated by sci-
entists from industrialised countries who typically constitute
80% of the participants involved [Fuchs, Virji, and Fleming
1998]. 
This itself leads to a number of problems - global change sci-
ence programs do not necessary reflect or address regional
needs and may not be appropriately implemented at the
national and regional levels. While developing countries
remain dependent on scientific findings and policy advice
from industrialised countries, they may not always trust such
information and /or analysis [Fuchs, Virji, and Fleming
1998].4
To address this participation gap, international programs
have to focus on understanding some of the structural and
other reasons why such a bias exists (some of these may be
obvious, such as a difference in resources, and some may be
less obvious, such as policy and administrative expectations
and requirements assumed by international programs, thus
CLIMATE CHANGE
reducing the scope for efficient interaction and
administrative compatibility with international
programs), and what its implications are likely to
be. Two major “gaps” that may result have been
pointed out elsewhere [Kandlikar and Sagar
1999]: 
• relevance gap – an imbalance in the kinds of
research performed, and a limited focus on
issues of relevance to developing countries.
This creates an international research agen-
da that excludes the needs and concerns
specific to these countries, and reduces the
motivation for their researchers to participate
in international efforts;
• perception gap – a variance in the views of
Northern and Southern analysts about the
role of research, analysis, and assessment in
the international discussions surrounding cli-
mate change. This variance in the perception
of international efforts in terms of “what are
we doing,” “why are we doing it,” and “how
are we doing it” may have serious implica-
tions for acceptability of international efforts.
Ambuj Sagar is a research fellow at the Belfer
Center for Science and International Affairs,
John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University, Cambridge MA 0 2 1 3 8 ;
email: ambuj_sagar@harvard.edu
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Footnotes
1 “Assessment” can be defined as a continuing
process through which knowledge is collected,
organized, interpreted, correlated and integrated,
often to inform the process of policy-making
[Kandlikar and Sagar 1999].
2 This is reminiscent of the traditional approach in
the development literature where the North is
treated as the reference end-point, and the pro-
cess of development is portrayed as that of mov-
ing towards this goal.
3 While the relation between science and policy is
often presented in the simple terms of “speaking
truth to power,” in reality it is rarely so. [Wildavsky
1979] As Jasanoff (1998) states, one can question
the notion of science as an “impartial adjunct to
policy” at several levels: the objectivity of science
(“science speaks truth”), the nature of the policy
making process (“science speaks, and politics
accepts, the truth”) and the ability of science to
define the truth as being independent of the power
that turns to it for guidance. 
4 A recognition of these, in fact, has been the
impetus behind the START initiative whose mis-
sion is to develop a system of regional networks of
collaborating scientists and institutions to (a) con-
duct research on regional aspects of global
change, (b) assess the impacts of regional find-
ings, and (c) provide regionally important integrat-
ed and evaluated information to policy makers
[Fuchs, Virji, and Fleming 1998]. Ironically, cur-
rently 8 of the 11 members of the START Scientific
Steering Committee are from industrialised coun-
tries - old habits die hard.
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It does not seem very long ago that climate change was
an issue for scientific research. The debate revolved
around the reliability of scientific data pointing to increases in
atmospheric carbon dioxide, and whether such increases
would lead inexorably to global warming. The literature was
full of graphs plotting atmospheric carbon in parts per million,
from measurements taken on the top of Hawaiian volcanoes,
and the debate raged back and forth between scientists of
different persuasions.
Even the initial attention of governments was devoted to see-
ing if it was possible to reach anything like a scientific con-
sensus on long-term climatic trends and their impact on
human society. For years, attention focused on the scientific
panels set up by the World Meteorological Organization and
the UN Environment Programme.
These efforts, if slow, have essentially succeeded. By and
large the debate is no longer about whether the atmosphere
is growing warmer, but more about the pace of change, and
about the likely consequences. Of course, there are hold-
outs – scientists who believe that the case has not been con-
vincingly demonstrated. But then there are medical
researchers who do not believe there is a serious connection
between smoking and cancer. The fact is that the reality of
human-induced climate change is no longer seriously in dis-
pute.
The implications of climate change are serious, and the cost
of addressing them will be high. No doubt the decades of
effort to reach scientific consensus were a necessary pre-
condition for mustering the political will needed to take action.
The Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted in
Rio in 1992, and which came into force rapidly thereafter,
sets the stage for the political debate on climate change – not
whether it is a reality, and not specifically what to do about it
– but who carries the responsibility and how the burden will
be shared. Like so many global environmental issues, it final-
ly comes down to equity and burden-sharing.
There is no real debate on sources of atmospheric carbon
and other greenhouse gases. Their production is closely tied
to consumption – particularly consumption of energy. And
that is in turn linked closely to levels of industrialisation and
development. Since the rich countries have already triggered
much of the global warming, is it fair that they should ask the
poor countries to take a different path to development; and if
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the latter are inclined to, what inducements
might they be given?
So the debate on climate change has moved to
the centre of the political arena. Nowhere was
this clearer than in the discussions leading to
the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. For the first
time, the Kyoto Protocol set greenhouse gas
reduction targets for the Annex 1 countries to
meet. More interesting, it sanctioned (at least
in principle) a wide range of instruments for
meeting these targets, including using market-
based instruments in achieving desired bene-
fits with the greatest efficiency and at the low-
est cost. Thus the principle of emissions trad-
ing was accepted, along with the establishment
of a Clean Development Mechanism to facili-
tate transfer of environmentally-favourable
t e c h n o l o g y.
But, as we all know, if the market looks after effi-
ciency, it does not necessarily look after equity.
There remain strong currents of resistance to
the notion that the rich countries might essen-
tially buy their way out of their commitments,
often further enriching themselves in the pro-
cess.
Depending on one’s perspective, the Kyoto
Protocol either represents a stunning advance,
not only in recognition of the issue but in allow-
ing innovation to characterise the response. Or
it can represent yet another put-off commitment,
leaving the privileged in position and the under-
privileged to suffer.
I tend to place myself towards the optimistic end
of the spectrum, though not at its extreme.
Because acknowledging the reality of global
warming will mean dealing with it or suffering the
consequences. And dealing with it will inevitably
lead to an intense exploration of how to meet the
targets in the most appropriate way. And in a
consensus-based system, appropriate solutions
will be solutions that minimise the price while
addressing some of the underlying equity
issues.
This is potentially good news to the
environmentalist, and this is where the
clear link between climate change and
environmental security come in.
Persistent global warming – even if the
increase in average global atmospher-
ic temperature is only a few degrees –
will lead to rising sea levels. With a sig-
nificant percentage of the world’s pop-
ulation living on the coastline, this has
obvious security implications. How
much greater are those implications in
those countries like Bangladesh where
not only the majority of the population
lives very close to sea level, but where
land and resources are in such
demand that there is nowhere for them
to go. What is true of population is also
true of productive capacity. Countries
like Egypt and Thailand have a high
proportion of their productive capacity
located at less than one meter above
sea level.
From a security point of view, changing
patterns of rainfall, and the increasing
variability of temperature and precipita-
tion extremes could be far more signif-
icant. And to make matters worse,
those most vulnerable to the impacts of
extreme weather phenomena are the
poor and disenfranchised – precisely
those who are least equipped to defend
themselves. The security implications
of large numbers of people displaced
by ever more frequent floods and
droughts is sobering.
We know already that the cost of
humanitarian assistance has been ris-
ing steadily around the world; the cost
of peace-keeping has been rising at an
even steeper rate. Many of the situa-
tions demanding peace-keeping or
humanitarian intervention are linked to
environmental phenomena, often
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The Kyoto Protocol is the most significant economic
agreement since the World Trade Organization (WTO)
was created in Marrakech in 1994, and is arguably the
most complex international agreement ever adopted.
Parties to the Protocol, if it is ratified, may find themselves
confronting the principles and rules of the multilateral trading
regime administered by the WTO in their attempts to fulfil
their Kyoto obligations. This paper sketches out how those
conflicts might arise, in an effort to find ways in which they
might be avoided.
The Protocol
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (FCCC) is a framework for action to limit or reduce
emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), such as carbon
dioxide whose concentrations have risen significantly as a
result of human activities. It was signed by over 150 states at
the June 1992 “Rio” Summit (the United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development). It entered into force in
March 1994 and has been ratified by 176 countries. Parties
included in Annex I to the Convention (developed countries
and those in transition to a market economy) undertook a
non-binding commitment to reduce their anthropogenic GHG
emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000.
The third Conference of the Parties to the Convention was
held in December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan, and resulted in the
adoption of the Kyoto Protocol to the FCCC. Annex I Parties
committed to legally binding targets to limit or reduce emis-
sions of six major GHGs, with an aggregate goal of a 5 per-
cent reduction from 1990 levels by 2008-2012. As of
February 1999, 76 countries have signed the Protocol and
three have ratified it.
The fourth Conference of the Parties was held in November
1998 in Buenos Aires. Parties adopted the Buenos Aires Plan
of Action, a work plan with firm deadlines to address issues
raised in Kyoto and to further the implementation of the
Protocol, which will enter into force when a majority of Parties
representing 55 percent of total Annex I emissions have rati-
fied it. (Note that this arrangement gives the United States an
effective veto.)
The Kyoto Protocol established three “flexibility mechanisms”
to assist Parties in meeting their targets: emissions trading
(Article 17), joint implementation between Annex I countries
(Article 6), and the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) (Article 12). None of these
has yet been precisely described by the negoti-
ations, but most of the basic ideas are clear.
Emissions trading allows Annex I Parties to
trade emissions reductions among themselves,
buying or selling credit toward their commit-
ments. Joint implementation involves collabora-
tions among developed countries and countries
in transition, on projects that will reduce carbon
emissions from the baseline scenario. Such
projects will earn emissions reduction credits.
The CDM will provide incentives to firms invest-
ing in emissions-reducing projects in developing
countries, with credits being divided between
the host country and the investing firm.
The issues
Kyoto raises a number of trade and environ-
ment issues, most of which will come to the fore
as Parties seek to fulfil their obligations to
reduce emissions. It is highly likely that govern-
ments with differentiated legal and political com-
mitments will implement these obligations in
ways that favour their domestic industries.
Policies and measures with potential conflict for
the multilateral trading system include:
Carbon tax with border adjustment The idea
of a tax on the carbon emitted in the process of
producing a good, whether a unit of energy or a
tonne of steel, has been around for some time.
Both the U.S. and the E.U. have tried in recent
years to implement such taxes, and both failed.
But countries’ obligations under the Kyoto
Protocol are bound to give greater impetus to
such schemes. The main obstacle to implemen-
tation is the penalty that such schemes assess
domestic producers, who must face imports that
may not have paid such a tax, and who must
compete with similarly untaxed goods on the
international market.
Both the U.S. and the E.U. responded to this
competitiveness asymmetry by considering a
“border tax adjustment” scheme. Such
a scheme might remit carbon or energy
taxes on exports, so that domestic
manufacturers would be competitive
abroad, and would assess a tax on
imports equal to the amount the good
would have been taxed had it been
manufactured domestically. The former
is GAT T-legal. The adjustment for
imports is controversial (not to mention
methodologically challenging), and the
spectre of a GATT/WTO challenge vis-
ited the debates in both the U.S. and
the E.U.
The problem is that while the GATT
rules allow for border tax adjustment,
the traditional interpretation is that the
only taxes eligible for adjustment are
those levied directly on products, such
as sales or value-added taxes. A GATT
Working Party on the subject ruled that
“taxes not directly levied on products
were not eligible for adjustment, such
as social security charges ... and pay-
roll taxes”. By this interpretation, the
import adjustment described above
would be GATT-illegal, since the taxes
for which it adjusts are not levied direct-
ly on the products being traded, but are
levied indirectly, on the energy that was
used in the manufacture of those prod-
ucts. In this sense, the carbon/energy
tax is much like a social security charge
or payroll tax.
Subsidies, tax incentives G o v e r n-
ments may offer incentives to firms,
such as subsidies and tax incentives,
to become more energy efficient, in an
effort to reduce national carbon emis-
sions. The temptation for governments
will be to craft these such that only
domestic firms will qualify, in a desire to
foster industrial development at the
same time as protecting the environ-
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ment. Discriminatory subsidies and tax incentives are poten-
tially GATT-illegal.
A number of criteria collaborate to qualify a subsidy as GATT-
illegal. The subsidy must first be granted specifically to a par-
ticular industry or sector within a country (any conceivable
subsidy aimed at reducing GHGs would be specific in this
sense). It must then be either linked to exports of the sub-
sidised good, contingent on the use of domestic inputs, or
found to cause “adverse effects” to foreign competitors.
Defining adverse effects is rather complex, but it boils down
to calculating whether the subsidy impairs the market share
of a competing producer.
There is a particular type of environmental subsidy that is
GATT-legal, and which will probably be used to help domes-
tic industry adjust to the shock of Kyoto compliance. It covers
a one-time cost of firms adjusting to new environmental reg-
ulations, up to 20% of costs incurred.
Government procurement Another way to foster greater
energy efficiency is to decree that the purchases by govern-
ment departments, which in OECD countries typically amount
to 10 - 25% of GDP, will have to meet certain green stan-
dards. The greening of government procurement is proceed -
ing apace in OECD countries, in pursuit of a range of envi-
ronmental goals. In the context of climate change the criteria
might apply not only to the GHG emissions in the use and
disposal of the purchased products, but also in their manu-
facture.
Such schemes would enter grey legal territory under the
GATT. Under GATT rules, it has traditionally been seen as
illegal to discriminate at the border on the basis of how a
good is produced. (From an environmental perspective this is
madness, but the trade community fears that the criteria
could too easily be set up in such a way as to unfairly advan-
tage domestic producers.) However government procure-
ment does not fall under the GATT, but under the WTO’s
Agreement on Government Procurement (AGP). Unlike the
GATT, this agreement seems to allow discrimination based
on process and production methods (PPMs).
The more serious obstacle in the AGPis the requirement that
no procurement criteria be set up in a way so as to create
unnecessary barriers to trade. The key here is in the untest-
ed definition of “necessary”. If the history of the GATTis any-
thing to go by, it will be defined as “least-trade-
restrictive”, meaning governments will have to
justify their procurement schemes as the least-
trade-restrictive way to achieve the environmen-
tal goal in question. This would be a high hurdle
to clear.
The AGPat this point has only been signed by a
dozen or so countries, but they include the EC,
Japan and the United States.
Ecolabels Governments might also want to
develop ecolabels to certify that particular goods
involve exceptionally low GHG emissions, using
consumer preference as a weapon in the battle
to meet Kyoto obligations. Again, these stan-
dards might refer not just to GHGs emitted in
use or disposal, but also in the production pro-
cess.
One possible conflict with WTO rules is in using
such PPM-based distinctions, which are suspect
in the multilateral trade community. Ecolabels,
as voluntary standards, are covered under the
WTO’s Code of Good Practice, which spells out
the proper ways to create and implement such
standards. But there is an ongoing controversy
in the WTO as to whether the Code covers
PPM-based systems or not, and therefore as to
their ultimate legality. The more immediate
potential problem is in the construction of the
ecolabel. It is easy to set up categories and cri-
teria such that they unfairly favour domestic pro-
ducers. For this reason the Code of Good
Practice mandates procedures such as consul-
tation with interested foreign producers.
No ecolabel has ever been challenged by the
WTO nor, because of their voluntary nature, is
one likely to be. But if a programme of govern-
ment procurement used an ecolabel as the cri-
terion for purchase – a future possibility – then
the situation might change. The label in that
case would in some sense cease to be volun-
tary, meaning stricter rules would apply.
Product efficiency standards
Another way to increase energy effi-
ciency is to set high product standards.
Governments may, for example,
decree that all refrigerators or automo-
biles sold in or imported into their coun-
tries must operate at a certain level of
energy efficiency.
This is perfectly GATT-legal, but prob-
lems might arise if these regulations
were designed in such a way as to
e ffectively penalise certain foreign
firms in favour of domestic ones. In
December 1998, E.U. officials said they
would challenge Japan in the WTO if it
implements new emission standards
proposed by the Ministry of Transport
to control carbon dioxide (CO2) emis -
sions. Because they are based on the
weight of vehicles, the planned
Japanese rules would affect imports of
medium and luxury range cars, a
E.u.ropean speciality. By contrast,
Japanese cars – even those with high-
er fuel consumption rates – would
escape lightly.
Covenants, voluntary agreements
Governments may enter into agree-
ments with firms who “voluntarily”
improve their performance in terms of
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
Typically such agreements involve
some incentive for the firms involved,
whether a tax break or, more frequent-
ly, a promise of less onerous regulato-
ry treatment. This incentive is the prob-
lem, from a trade perspective, if it con-
stitutes an illegal subsidy according to
the definition elaborated above.
The Kyoto mechanisms The flexible
instruments under the Kyoto Protocol –
the Clean Development Mechanism,
Tradeable Emission Permits and Joint
Implementation – all create trading
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aggravated by destabilised weather patterns and climate sys-
tems. With continuing climate change, the situation is likely to
grow considerably worse. In the end, would it not be better to
invest in environmental management and mitigation of cli-
mate change – both positive actions that have multiple bene-
fits – rather than paying a hefty bill later on in disaster relief
and peacekeeping?
So the interesting link between climate change and environ-
mental security is not the technical one but the political one.
The security argument could help strengthen the political
resolve necessary to advance on climate change, to imple-
ment some of the creative ideas that are floating around and
– finally – to address the equity issues underlying climate
change politics.
relationships in goods and services which are exclusive to
FCCC signatories. For example, a party to the Protocol would
not be allowed to trade FCCC emission permits with a non-
Party. If both countries are WTO Members, this exclusivity
may violate the WTO’s Most Favoured Nation principle. This
principle, expressed in GATTArticle I, states that any trading
privilege a Member extends to another Member must be
extended to all Members. That is, all Members are most-
favoured.
Conclusions
The potential conflicts sketched out here are not so grave or
intractable as to threaten the integrity of either the FCCC or
the WTO. Even the simple analysis presented above, in dis-
cussing the relevant WTO rules, suggests some solutions.
The aim of this paper is to highlight the potential for conflict,
in the hope that changes in the existing trade law, or wisely
administered environmental law, or both, will prevent it from
materialising.
Aaron Cosbey is Programme Manager and Interim Director
of IISD’s Trade and Sustainable Development Programme.
James Cameron, Barrister, is Director at the Foundation for
International Environmental Law and Development, London.
This paper benefits from the comments of Chad Carpenter
and Victoria Kellet of IISD.
New resources on climate
change
Climate, Biodiversity and Forests: Issues and Opportunities emerging
from the Kyoto Protocol
WRI and IUCN; 1998, 40 pages, ISBN: 1-56973-285-X, $20.00
Over the past 150 years, deforestation has contributed an estimated 30 percent of the
atmospheric build-up of CO2. It is also a significant driving force behind the loss of genes,
species and critical ecosystem services. However, in the international policy arena,
biodiversity loss and climate change have often moved in wholly unconnected domains.
While the 1997 Kyoto Protocol is a key step towards the mitigation of climate change, it
leaves many questions unanswered, including the role of forests and land-use change
in meeting obligations to slow global warming.
Climate, Biodiversity and Forests examines why, with so much at stake, the role of
forests and land-use change under the Kyoto Protocol remains controversial. The report
focuses on the need for strong international commitments and concerted action.
Safe Climate, Sound Business: An action agenda
WRI; ISBN 1-56973-286-8; $15.00
1998 Building a Safe Climate, Sound Business Future (full report); 60 pages;
ISBN: 1-56973-287-6; $20
http://www.wri.org/wri/cpi/scsb
A project undertaken by WRI, Monsanto and British Petroleum explored a variety of
aspects of climate change to help understand the nature of the challenge and possible
policy responses. They looked at scenarios to meet future world energy demand that
showed increasing and stabilising greenhouse gas concentrations, explored new
technologies and potential business opportunities and discussed government policies
and how they could encourage businesses and consumers to respond. Three principle
conclusions emerged from the discussions:
• Climate change is a cause for concern and precautionary action is justified now;
• Business can contribute to climate protection efforts in substantial, positive ways by
helping to develop sound climate policies, by providing the research and technologies
needed to address the challenge, and by taking actions to reduce and offset their own
emissions;
• Flexible and market-orientated climate policies that implement national commitments
can address the long-term need to stabilise the concentration of greenhouse gases.
Such policies can facilitate a Safe Climate, Sound Business outcome by stimulating
innovation, early action, and cost-effective reductions. These policies can produce mul-
tiple co-benefits and reduce the risk of climate change caused by human activities.
Taking a Byte out of Carbon: Electronics Innovation for Climate
Protection
WRI, the Electronics Industries Alliance (EIA) and the International Cooperative
for Environmental Leadership (ICEL)
1998, 60 pages, ISBN: 1-56973-265-5; $20
While the U.S. struggles to forge a climate change policy, largely unnoticed are those
companies that see new business opportunities in products that reduce greenhouse gas
emissions and increase energy efficiency. Taking a Byte out of Carbon profiles technolo-
gy initiatives of electronics and communications companies to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions while at the same time promoting economic growth and improved living stan-
dards. The report illustrates how “smart” technologies place the electronics industry in a
prime position to provide practical solutions to climate change.
Shades of Equity
Article by Anju Sharma in Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) “Down to
Earth” Magazine, Vol 7, No 19, February 28 1999
Negotiators from developing countries lack the strategy to put equity on the global climate
change agenda. But the U.S. has already begun to define it for them. And that could eas-
ily become equity as defined by the world if developing countries do not watch out...
Centre for Science and Environment (CSE), 41 Tughlakabad Institutional Area, New Delhi 110 062;
http://www.cseindia.org
Climate change and environmental security
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NETWORK NEWS
Joint CEESP/Ring Meeting
held in Gland
3-5 February 1999
The first “back-to-back” CEESP/Ring meeting was held in early February
at IUCN HQ in Gland. As well as providing an opportunity for the CEESP
Steering Committee to discuss mutual areas of interest and explore
collaborative research opportunities with Ring members, the meeting
also encouraged input from a number of IUCN staff based in Gland.
CEESP Steering Committee meeting
In-depth discussions were held on the difficulties IUCN has had in
integrating social and economic issues into its programme, and the role
of CEESPin helping to address this. The meeting explored ways of
strengthening links between the commission and the IUCN Secretariat,
hitherto hampered by a lack of financial resources – and the vacuum in
the Social Policy Group since the sudden departure of Grazia Borrini-
Feyerabend more than a year ago. Since then the Social Policy Group
has been going through a transition to a more regionally-based Social
Policy Global Team, and Maria Christina Espinosa, has recently been
appointed as its Global Facilitator. The Secretariat support to the
commission will be shared by her and Frank Vorhies of the Economic
Services Unit. The CEESP Steering Committee expressed the hope that
this support would be reinforced by the arrival of the new Director
General, Maritta Koch-Weser, herself a social scientist.
The CEESP Steering Committee were joined by Ring members for the
second day of the meeting. In what proved to be a very positive
exchange, a number of areas of mutual interest were identified. In
particular, the Ring priority theme on MEAs will directly inform one of the
activities of the Economic Policy Working Group; the Governance
Working Group project exploring ways to link governance issues at local,
national and global levels, and the Ethics Working Group will both be
drawing on case study material from the Ring.
Both the CEESPSteering Committee and the Ring members fully
supported the proposal to hold an IUCN conference on Economic and
Social Policy. Members of the Secretariat pointed out that though a great
deal of work was already being done in the areas of economic and
social policy in IUCN, especially in the regions, it was not always
communicated sufficiently to the members and those outside the Union.
A conference would provide a vehicle not only for showcasing such
work, but for exploring in greater depth global policy areas – not
traditionally the domain of IUCN – such as climate change, trade and
sustainable development, and desertification, and emerging issues
hitherto unexplored by the Union, such as consumption, the ethics of
economics and the process of globalisation.
Following the meeting, Maritta Koch-Weser expressed support for the
proposal, and a further meeting was held in March between members of
the CEESP Steering Committee and interested IUCN staff. It was
agreed that a conference held back-to-back with the Council Meeting in
January 2000 might be the first of a series of events leading up to the
next WCC in Amman, and that a scoping exercise should initially be
carried out to gather material and select themes.
Further information in the next issue of Policy Matters.
Ethics proposal endorsed
CEESPSteering Committee members endorsed the Ethics Working
Group proposal circulated by Stephen Marglin. Prepared by a number of
authors including Stephen Marglin, Adil Najim, Tariq Banuri and Franck
Amalric, the proposal sets out a framework of activity which aims to
legitimise, encourage and initiate a debate about alternative ethical
approaches to ecology. The debate in Kyoto 1997 over global trading in
“permits to pollute” illustrates the relevance of this research. Whether or
not acknowledged by its supporters, an elaborate ethical system lies
behind the idea that a market in pollution abatement is the best way to
address the problem. While “economistic ethics” represent an important
point of view, these ethical principles become problematic when their
advocates insist that this is the only legitimate viewpoint.
The Working Group proposes to challenge the dominance of market
thinking, and to articulate at least one alternative to economistic ethics,
based on the rights of nature (as against the economic view which
begins and ends with human beings) and even more importantly on the
relationships between people and between people and nature.
The Ethics WG will work closely with other IUCN commissions and
CEESP working groups, in particular the Governance WG; the
Collaborative Management WG, and the Commission on Environmental
Law, with the aim of tying the working group’s investigation into the
continuing work of IUCN in such areas as biodiversity, sustainable use
and the World Conservation Strategy.
It is envisaged that the work will take shape in a conference to take
place six to nine months after funding is secured.
For a copy of the proposal, contact Catherine McCloskey, CEESP
Secretariat
Ring meeting 
Reported by Viv Davies, IIED 
Held in Gland, the 4th Meeting of the Ring gathered representatives
from each of the Ring institutions. It began with a roundtable report from
members on regional networking developments and new alliances, and
the degree to which the Ring has helped facilitate these initiatives. Ring
members will continue to develop regional networks and alliances, and
more broadly seek to expand the international Ring network by (a)
identifying new potential collaborative partners, and (b) through
continued and closer co-operation with the CEESP network. Tariq Banuri
highlighted this connection by pointing out that the Ring provides
substance to the work of CEESP, while CEESP provides structure to the
work of the Ring. At the close of the session, the Ring group reinforced
its identity as a ‘global’rather than a ‘southern’voice that is striving to
create, develop and enhance local to global linkages. 
Members also reinforced a common commitment to strengthening
existing bi-lateral exchanges and research activity around the four
identified priority themes of:
• sustainable livelihoods; 
• MEAs (multi-lateral environmental agreements); 
• water issues; and 
• policy impacts. 
Priority research themes
Following a lively discussion on sustainable livelihoods led by Ashok
Khosla from DA, Ring members recognised the importance of continuing
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to develop collaborative thinking around this theme. An existing DA
paper will be re-articulated with views and polemic from Ring members
that will incorporate perspectives on ‘mini credit’initiatives, the ‘non-
monetised’economy, support systems and social capital, and access to
natural resources and land issues. By exploiting its comparative
strengths is this area, the Ring considered how, as a group, it might
better inform the general debate on sustainable livelihoods in a more
practical way, rather than a purely conceptual one. A strategic framework
was discussed as a means of guiding government and NGO’s in
planning and implementing sustainable livelihoods policies and
strategies.
A recent paper on MEAs written by Adil Najim was discussed in light of
the Ring’s current focus and position on this theme. Plans have been
made to develop papers around issues of climate change, equity and
biodiversity, trade and sustainable development. The group considered
ways of synthesising current thinking and expertise so as to inform the
global debate more effectively. Joint briefs; policy guides and workshops
were proposed and are currently being discussed and planned by the
group.
Atiq Rahman presented BCAS’s latest work on water issues. It was
agreed that there was a rich source of material and current initiatives
upon which to draw and collaborate from amongst the Ring partners.
Issues of linkages, privatisation and equity were discussed and a paper
is currently being developed by BCAS which will incorporate
contributions from the group.
Koy Thomson received comments from the group on a collaborative
draft paper currently being developed on policy impacts - “Working on
Policy and Institutions: Why it Matters”. The paper aims to capture
something of the benefits and impacts of the Ring institutions in their
research and policy work, and as such addresses the crux of who and
what the Ring is. Following further review and restructuring the paper
will serve as a valuable insight and guide into how organisations like
those in the Ring make decisions and can work collaboratively to
influence international and regional sustainable development policy
making and institutions.
External relations and CEESPcollaboration
Plans were made at the meeting to extend and develop the Ring’s
external relations through various channels, including a new Ring
publication series, web-site development and other promotional
activities. On the research side, the Ring will shortly be appointing a new
co-ordinator based in the South whose role will be to help integrate and
develop the Ring’s collaborative research and policy work.
Coming soon from IIED...
Capitals & Capabilities: A
framework for analysing
peasant viability, rural
livelihoods and poverty in
the Andes.
Contemporary debates on the rural
sector in Latin America have led many to
question the future viability of peasant
livelihoods in the Andes. Current
discussion is often limited because it
confuses agrarian with rural livelihoods,
implies that rural people assess livelihood
options according to income criteria, and suggests an impermeable
barrier dividing viable and non-viable units. The framework developed
here challenges these assumptions and moves the debate forward,
reviewing recent livelihood transitions in the region, which suggest
there is no impermeable barrier that prevents rural people moving in
and out if the agrarian economy. It draws on ethnographic and
sociological evidence that suggests that rural people make choices on
livelihoods based on a multitude of criteria, of which income is only
one. Livelihoods do more than just support life, they also make it
meaningful, and so the maintenance of cultural and social practices
that accompany rural residence are also important. The framework
argues that our analyses of rural livelihoods need to take account of:
people’s access to five types of capital asset; how they combine and
transform those assets to build livelihoods; how they are able to
expand their asset bases through engaging with the state, market and
civil society; and the ways in which they are able to deploy and
enhance their capabilities both to make living more meaningful and to
change the dominant rules and relationships governing the ways in
which resources are controlled, distributed and transformed into
income streams. Particular attention is paid to the importance of social
capital as an asset through which people are able to widen their
access to resources and other actors.
Policies that Work for Sustainable Agriculture & Regenerating
Rural Economies series. 
There are enough examples world-wide to suggest that agriculture
which is pro-sustainability and pro-people is working. We now
understand the concept of ‘sustainable’agriculture is not confined
within the farm boundary, but has strong links (and a potential to be a
dynamic force within) a wider rural economy. So, ‘sustainable
agriculture’not only contributes to greater agricultural production, but
also environmental regeneration and local economic development.
IIED’s Sustainable Agriculture & Rural Livelihoods Programme has
undertaken collaborative research to look at, ‘Policies that Work for
Sustainable Agriculture and Regenerating Rural Economies’. The
overall objective of this research is to understand the policy contexts
and instruments that can promote sustainable agriculture and social
change. This has been done in high, medium and low income
countries in both South and North. ‘Success stories’have been
identified and the policy environment that has permitted these to
emerge has been investigated. Are there lessons we can learn from
these ‘islands of success’that will help us turn islands into continents?
Capitals & Capabilities is one of several papers which provide the
contextual and conceptual background to the Policies that Work
programme. A review will appear in the next issue of Policy Matters.
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Symposium on Global Accords for
Sustainable Development: Innovative
Mechanisms and Enabling
Technologies
MIT, September 16-18 1998
From a report by Nazli Choucri
International deliberations at Earth Summit + 5 (evaluating Agenda 21
and the Conventions) and UNFCCC/COP3 (framing the Kyoto Protocol)
reflected diverse perspectives and colliding priorities in many aspects of
the global agenda.
Global policy priorities appear segmented along two identifiable lines:
one focuses on climate change – emphasised mainly by industrial
countries; the other one concentrates on sustainable development –
supported largely by developing countries. In order to move strategically
to future assessments of progress on the Rio accords, it is essential to
address potential sources of contention, highlight the commonalities that
cut across policy in the international community, find ways to address
both sustainability and climate change, and reinforce effective
collaboration between industrial and developing countries.
These were the aims of a high level symposium held at MITin
September 1998. The third international Symposium on Global Accords
for Sustainable Development, brought together an august group of
leading experts from international organisations, non-profit
organisations, research foundations, business groups and centres of
excellence in science and technology.
Earth Summit + 5 held in June 1997 to assess the post-Rio process,
served as a ‘baseline’for the Symposium. A panel led off by a keynote
speech by Ian Johnson of the World Bank, included Gerhard Wahlers,
director of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and Ashok Khosla of
Development Alternatives and was divided as to the gains and losses,
and the overall implications of the post-Rio process. A session on
emergent North-South Responses which followed, crystallised core
contentions in specific terms, by articulating views from different national
perspectives and at different levels. The session also identified new
opportunities and potential points of effective conciliation. Emergent
initiatives appear to be contingent on collaborative action involving key
stakeholders (mostly the public and private sectors). 
Addressing innovations at the global level, a session followed on
ongoing institutional developments – both governmental and non-
governmental, and highlighted the range of novelty as well as the extent
of participation from both the state system and civil society worldwide.
The focus was on the class of initiatives called the ‘Clean Development
Mechanism’, formally presented in Article XII of the Kyoto Protocol. A
further session highlighted collaborative approaches to the challenge of
climate change, focusing on the urban environmental and development
problems in industrialising countries, which stem from continued and
explosive urban growth, absence of adequate energy and infrastructure
services, and the lack of mechanisms for accelerating uses of relevant
technological interventions. Initiatives were discussed that seek to
introduce effective product and process technologies to transform
operations towards greater efficiency and environmental soundness,
consistent with socio-economic conditions. Other approaches seek to
provide venues through which the participating institutions can contribute
with expertise, technology and financial resources to the goals of
technology advances, adaptation and development in industrialising
countries.
Clearly little can be achieved towards sustainability without financial
resources and the active involvement of the business community. New
initiatives which have been formulated and ‘tested’provide a basis for
more robust strategies. Reducing barriers for effective participation of
the private sector is important. If there is one consensus in the
international community it is that alternatives to ‘business as usual’are
evolving, possibly accompanied by mechanisms for facilitating
sustainability. A session focused on creating enabling market conditions
buttressed by supportive public interventions. The final session looked at
long term technological innovations, alternative energy technology
strategies and imperatives of knowledge networking on a global scale.
Conclusions
Specific conclusions emerged as participants reviewed the overall
discussion and debate.
Converging on priorities:
• The International Community must reinforce the emergent partner-
ships across economic sectors, national boundaries and issue areas
– in the private and public domains;
• We must facilitate stakeholder participation (both private and public)
in decisions and processes related to sustainability in the private and
public domain;
• It is now essential to establish formal institutional requirements for
governance and administration in the context of sustainable ventures,
strategies and initiatives. This is especially important in relation to
financing mechanisms and new investment strategies;
• We must establish operational mechanisms of accountability for the
clean development mechanism (CDM) and clarify the underlying and
basic principles that drive accountability;
• Efforts should be made to improve our understanding of the unintend-
ed consequences of technology change, and to accelerate implemen-
tation of the intended consequences;
• The ‘population factor’ should be included in all global deliberations
on environment and development;
• It is essential to close the technology-policy gap, namely, the gap
between available technology and knowledge about this availability on
the one hand, and the policy and decision-making contexts nationally
and internationally, on the other.
Defining a new initiative
Emerging from the Symposium was the formation of the Consortium on
Global Accords for Sustainable Development. This initiative consists of
two major thrusts: one is the internet global partnerships anchored in
GSSD; and the second is the companion effort referred to as the Policy
Dialogues. The Consortium was inaugurated at UNFCCC-COP4 in
Buenos Aires in November 1998. Founding members include the Global
Environment Facility, the World Bank, the Xerox Corporation, the
MISTRAFoundation, and AT&T. In the next issue of Policy Matters we
will present the Consortium’s mission and goal, its work statement and
the targeted outcomes, as well as a report on next steps. 
Workshop on Biodiversity, Climate
Change and Finance
11th Session of the Global Biodiversity Forum, 6-8 November 1998
On 6-8 November 1998, some 140 participants from 40 countries
participated in the 11th session of the Global Biodiversity Forum in
Buenos Aires, Argentina. The Forum, entitled Exploring Synergy
Between the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the
Convention on Biological Diversity, was intended to investigate ways in
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which global and national actions to combat climate change and halt
biodiversity loss could be co-ordinated and integrated. One of the four
workshops held examined the role of finance in furthering these two
goals. 
The workshop, organised by IUCN Economics Service Unit, Trexler and
Associates, and the IUCN Commission on Environmental, Economic and
Social Policy, was attended by about 25 experts, representing
multilateral organisations, NGOs, private sector utilities, financial
services, academic and research institutions. Existing financial
instruments include: the Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the three
market mechanisms established by the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC
— (1) international emissions trading; (2) joint implementation between
industrialised (Annex I) countries; and (3) the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM), an instrument for developed and developing country
co-operation. The workshop set out to address whether these
mechanisms were sufficient and whether it was necessary to develop
financial mechanisms and tools that support the objectives of both
conventions. 
The session, initially co-chaired by Atiq Rahman, Vice Chair of CEESP,
and Mark Trexler, discussed three topics: (1) Energy and Conservation
Linkages; (2) Issues related to the Clean Development Mechanism; and
(3) Implications for the private sector. The main points from the
discussion are summarised below.
1. Energy and Conservation Linkages: Discussion centred on refining
the linkage between climate change and biodiversity in regards to
institutional, financial, economic and legal issues. It was agreed that the
most critical linkages to ensure co-ordination and synergy between the
biodiversity and climate change agendas were the provision of
appropriate legal frameworks, institutional capacity, and economic
incentives. Moreover, the adequacy of the Kyoto Protocol’s current
emission reduction targets was debated. Specifically, doubts were raised
about the ability of the Kyoto Protocol’s flexible mechanisms to generate
sufficient funds to ensure government compliance and technology
transfer. Two alternative modalities were presented to meet these
concerns:
An international currency transactions tax of .25% might be levied in
order to generate capital of approximately $100-200 billion per year,
which could be accessed by developing country economies. The funds
generated would be used for projects measured against an energy
efficiency standard, renewable energy projects, and stimulation of
markets. It was suggested that initial research indicated an openness on
the part of some members of the financial markets sector to such a
move. Mechanisms for disbursement were left open for further
discussion. 
A second suggestion was that consideration be given to equitable
participation by developing countries by the allocation of entitlements
within the framework of the Kyoto Protocol. These entitlements would be
available to all countries according to current per-capita carbon
utilisation, with the clear objective of convergence and the switch from
carbon based to environmentally friendly non-carbon based energy
sectors. 
The potential for existing institutional structures to facilitate linkages
between climate change and biodiversity in policy development and
financing was presented. It was recognised that the Global
Environments Facility (GEF), as the interim financial mechanism for both
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), had a
comparative advantage in furthering the policy debate on this topic by
helping to identify: (1) effective governance mechanisms; (2) benefits
from current projects: and (3) lessons for future financing. 
2. Issues Relating to the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM):
Several presentations addressed the CDM, the instrument for developed
and developing country co-operation under the Kyoto Protocol. Many
talks illustrated the weakness of the CDM with respect to equity,
technology transfers and biodiversity conservation, with particular
relevance to developing countries. The potential for certain developing
countries to be marginalised in the CDM, and hence in the
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, was pointed out. In general, it was
felt that the CDM could be used by developed countries as a way of
avoiding the responsibility of cutting emissions at home. It was
suggested that the two modalities presented above may represent ways
of dealing with this problem. 
3. Implications for the Private Sector: First, the private sector’s role in
implementing the Kyoto Protocol was recognised. Presentations by the
private sector demonstrated their willingness to participate in flexible
mechanisms if given the opportunity for early action. However, it was
suggested that the current incentive system was inadequate to provide
sufficient encouragement for broad private sector participation, and that
those that do take early action could be penalised for doing so. 
Second, it was accepted that risk mitigation measures (e.g. insurance)
might provide a way of increasing financial flows, generate equity and
provide a mechanism for linking inter-sector policy implementation and
compliance. The use of risk management tools could help implement the
objectives of the CBD and UNFCCC, and national sustainable
development plans. Critical areas that risk management strategies could
address included political and institutional risk, project performance risk
and trading risk. 
MEETINGS
IUCN launches initiative on climate change
The Workshop on Biodiversity, Climate Change and Finance was one of a
number organised by IUCN as part of its climate change initiative. Aimed at fur-
thering understanding of climate change and its relationship to conservation of
natural resources and biodiversity, this initiative is an outgrowth of a recom-
mendation at the 1996 World Conservation Congress which called on IUCN to
develop an international strategy on climate change. One of the first activities
was to co-convene the ninth Global Biodiversity Forum during the negotiations
of the Kyoto Protocol in December 1997. In the following May, IUCN organised
a briefing and facilitated discussions at the COP4 of the Convention on
Biodiversity on the implications of the Kyoto Protocol for the objectives of the
CBD. At the 12th GBF in Dakar in December 1998, Brett Orlando, Climate
Change Programme Officer of IUCN, chaired a workshop on climate change
and desertification which examined the inputs the desertification community
could have into the UNFCCC process on issues such as adaptation and
mitigation.
IUCN has also participated in a number of international forums on how to
design and implement the Clean Development Mechanism. The climate
change initiative has published a number of briefing documents, including
“Climate, Biodiversity and Forests” jointly published with WRI, examining the
issues and opportunities for forests and other biodiversity in the Kyoto Protocol.
For further information, contact Brett Orlando, Climate Change Programme
Officer, IUCN/Washington Office, 1630 Connecticut Avenue NW, 3rd Floor,
Washington DC 20009, USA; Tel:+1 202 387 4826  Fax:+1 202 387 4823
Email: borlando@iucnus.org
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IUCN celebrates 50th
anniversary
3-5 November 1998
In November last year, some 300 government leaders, scientists
and conservation experts gathered in Fontainebleau – the town
where IUCN was founded fifty years ago. The theme “Imagine
tomorrow’s world” set the stage for a series of events including a
three-day symposium focusing on the three Cs: Conservation,
Communities and Consumption.  The four high-level workshops
held under each of these themes, provided an opportunity for
delegates to take stock of the Union’s achievements in the past 50
years, but more importantly, to address the challenges facing IUCN
now and into the next millennium, and the ways in which IUCN will
need to adapt if it is to fulfil its mission.
As chair of the first Consumption workshop, “Living within our
Limits”, Tariq Banuri reflects on the changing focus of IUCN’ s
work. In his opening comments, he argues that while IUCN initially
started with conservation proper, it has gradually moved on to
practices involving communities, and will need in future to focus
increasingly on behavioural issues that cause degradation,
embedded as they are in the dominant culture of consumption. 
Opening comments: Living within our limits
Tariq Banuri
It is my great pleasure to welcome you to the first session of Atelier 3 of
the Fontainebleau Symposium, “Imagine Tomorrow’s World”. Before I
invite the keynote speaker, Mr Anil Agarwal, I would like to make two
brief comments, one on the relationship of this panel with the rest of the
symposium, and the other on the issue that lies before us.
As you are aware, the symposium has been structured along three
streams: conservation, community and consumption. While this is not
the only way in which it could have been structured, the beauty of this
arrangement is that on the one hand it overlaps with and evokes some
of the other possible structures, and on the other hand goes beyond
them. Take a few obvious possibilities:
Time: past, present and future.
Level: global, national and local.
Type of action: research, advice and advocacy.
Disciplinary base: natural sciences, social sciences and humanities.
Medium of communication: Academic, policy/popular journals,
electronic
It could be argued that IUCN (and the conservation community more
generally) started initially with conservation proper, moved on to
practices that involved communities more directly into their work, and
might have increasingly to focus on behavioural issues that cause
degradation. In other words, the past was conservation; the present is
communities; and the future, consumption.
Similarly, it could be argued that conservation efforts were oriented
towards national policy makers; their analytical framework was provided
by the natural sciences; they were led by scientists; and relied mainly on
academic journals for communication. Community participation on the
other hand is oriented towards the local level; its analytical framework
comes increasingly from the social sciences; it places NGOs and policy
oriented forums and popular print media for communication. Finally,
concerns about consumption are global in nature; these concerns need
the intellectual structures provided by ethicists and philosophers; they
will rely increasingly on advocacy and publicity; and are tailored to the
electronic age.
This is a fairly simple, even simplistic description of a process of change
in the manner in which the heartland of conservation has been defined.
But the point is deeper than this. The point is that all of the categories I
have mentioned have also been transformed over time. Conservation
has become oriented towards community participation, and community-
building efforts have increasingly begun to use conservation as an entry
point as well as a goal of collective action. In other words, the papers
presented in the streams on conservation and communities are as
much about the future as this one. They too combine natural and social
sciences and ethics in innovative ways to help us understand the
human predicament today. And all of them are oriented towards
practical people engaged in finding concrete and practical solutions to
our collective problems.
Having said this, I now wish to turn to the subject of the present stream,
consumption, and make a brief comment on the salience of this issue of
tomorrow’s world.
The former President of IUCN, Sir Shridath Ramphal, in his valedictory
address to the IUCN General Assembly in Buenos Aires, called
consumption one of the forgotten issues of UNCED. Indeed it is a
forgotten issue of the environmental movement. The greatest danger to
the environment comes not from its consequences in selected areas but
the enormous and relentless pressure that the insatiable desire for
consumption places upon it. Today we need an approach to
conservation that focuses as much on the causes as on the
consequences of degradation.
Why is consumption a forgotten issue in the environmental debate?
One reason is that the environmental movement traditionally focused on
a different agenda - “building a new Ark”, as one of the founders of
IUCN put it - which sought protection rather than prevention. There are
other problems as well. I have argued elsewhere (Banuri 1994) that the
implicit associations of the metaphor of the Ark - technological optimism,
screening and exclusion, and the creation of “controlled” environments
through isolation and segregation - led many in the South to view
UNCED (and by implication the environmental movement) quite
differently from its architects. It is more appropriate to say that they saw
the architects “building a new Cross” - on which the South would be
asked to sacrifice itself for the sins of “humanity”. The point here is not
to evaluate the validity of different metaphors, but to emphasise the
distance between them. Despite a decade of intense engagement, we
have been unable to bridge or reduce this divide, and the battle lines at
Kyoto (1997) or Buenos Aires (1998) are virtually the same as those in
Rio de Janeiro in 1992.
A second reason has to do with the nature of the dominant cultural
values today. With a little help from the media, the advertising industry,
and the corporate world, accelerated and intensified by the process of
globalisation, we have become a society of consumers. This means not
simply that people consume, but rather that they have to consume ever-
increasing amounts of an endless array of newer and newer goods. (It
does not matter very much whether this is because of the need for
markets to function or for consumers to find meaning in their lives).
The problem was underlined almost 70 years ago by John Maynard
Keynes in a relatively little known essay, “The Economic Possibilities of
Our Grandchildren”. This was published in the fall of 1930 in The Nation
and Athenaeum weekly (republished in Keynes 1933). Keynes argued
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that “[T]he economic problem [italics in original] may be solved, or be at
least within sight of solution, within a hundred years” (ibid. p. 366). In
other words, the human race would, for the first time in recorded history,
have the ability to produce enough to meet everyone’s needs. Keynes’s
goal in this essay was two-fold. On the one hand he wanted to counter
the spirit of doom and gloom that then prevailed. On the other hand, he
wished to point to a different danger, namely that our value system,
oriented as it is towards accumulation, is totally unequipped to deal with
an age where scarcity is no longer the driving force.
It is not 100 years since he wrote that essay, but the generation that
would have been his grandchildren’s is here and his predictions have
been more than vindicated. Given the dominant value system, geared
towards acquisition, accumulation and avarice, Keynes’s economic
problem has been transformed from the problem of production
(presumably for everyone’s needs) to the more virulent form of
consumption - for everyone’s greed. In other words, a problem that did
(or could) have a solution has been transformed into one that does not
have a solution and cannot have a solution.
Stephen Marglin (1995) points out in a review of the half-century
following the publication of Keynes’s essay, while the statistical trend is
precisely as Keynes had predicted. “It hardly seems that we are solving
the economic problem, even if we confine ourselves to the United
States”. The real problem, Marglin suggests, is that Keynes has grossly
underestimated the power of what he called “relative needs”, namely
those that make us feel superior to our fellows. By focusing on the
lesser needs, which he termed “absolute needs” (and later economists
called “basic needs”), Keynes seemed to discount the insatiability of
human desire for consumption. As Marglin notes, “If the market is
dedicated to fulfilling (insatiable) relative needs, ... then far from being a
solution to the problem, growth is its cause. The possibility of growth lets
the genie of scarcity out of the bottle, but no amount of growth can ever
give everybody more than its neighbour”.
The centrality of consumption is now so ingrained that no viable political
or environmental movement in the north or the south dares to place its
reduction at the centre of its agenda. There is no point in blaming the
corporate world for this. Unlike production, for which corporations must
take central responsibility, it is the global elite that must take primary
responsibility for sustaining the ideology of endless consumption.
One cannot escape the impression that the neglect of consumption in
the environmental debate is in part due to values shared by those who
influence decisions and lead opinions. In recognising this point, one has
to move beyond the simple North-South divide that has dominated the
issue in the past. Contrary to what many of us had believed and even
argued a few years ago, the fundamental divide today is no longer
between the North and the South (although these terms continue to
provide shorthand handles to discuss such issues). It is rather between
a globalised, almost infinitely mobile, centrally hybridised elite and a
localised, involuntarily mobile, and culturally disempowered non-elite. It
is between the tourists and the vagabonds (Bauman 1998), between the
omnivores, and the ecological refugees (Gadgil and Guha 1995),
between the affluent society and the castaways (Latouche 1993).
Now the global consumer ethic and the global threat to the environment
is sustained and driven by the tourists. It is important to recall that
IUCN’s 50th anniversary symposium, this meeting is a meeting of
tourists, of the omnivores, regardless of whether they are from the north
or the south, the east or the west. The tourists are not the solution; they
are part of the problem.
These are the same persons who - irrespective of their national or
hemispherical origin - shape the global agenda including the agenda for
the environment. With their high mobility, their laptops, and their
membership in a global community, they provide the most compelling
and yet the most inappropriate role models for the 21st century. They
shape an ideology whose purpose is largely to protect their own
lifestyles. Even the defensiveness of the “development set” is missing
here, not least evidenced in the march that UNDP has stolen on the
issue by publishing its Human Development Report 1998 on
consumption. I am reminded of a keynote speaker at a world conference
on hunger. Referring to the cornucopian feast that preceded her after-
dinner address, she said, “If this is any indication of how these things
work, I must cancel my next speaking engagement - at the global
conference on population!”
Neither consumption nor the environment is a technical relationship
between ends and means. These are at their heart political problems
involving conflicts over resources as well as conflicts over meanings.
The process of degradation is driven by the very systems of thought and
meaning that sustain the global economy. The conflicts over
degradation, are just as important in protecting nature as are the conflict
over rights. We may be on the right side on one issue but that is no
ground for comfort if that places us on the wrong side of the more lethal
divide.
By not addressing the central problem of our times, by refusing to
acknowledge our own complicity in it, by acting in an unreflective,
uncritical and complacent manner, we are rapidly becoming
marginalised and socially irrelevant. If the best we can do is to organise
self-congratulatory meetings such as this one, our work will at best
become a form of therapy for the collective guilt of tourists addicted to
consumption.
There is a way out though. It has to start with the injection of a note of
self-criticism into the debate, the re-opening of the discussion of
consumption and its impacts, and the explicit recognition of our own role
in the problem. And it has to lead towards the identification of alternative
utopias. Bauman, reflecting perhaps a sympathetic Northern
perspective, laments that vagabonds have no other images of the good
life, no alternative utopias, no political agenda of their own. Others (see
e.g. Nanny 1987, Agarwal and Narration 1991, Guha 1993) have argued
differently by articulating the alternative agendas that shape the
resistance to modernity. The environmental movement needs to engage
with such perspectives in a more meaningful manner.
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overcome problems. A colleague from the Uganda Wildlife Authority
said, “He was the kind of man who would try to mediate in any conflict.
The rebels would not have welcomed that.”
Although the tragic incident at Bwindi is likely to lead to a serious decline
in eco-tourism and a consequent reduction in the capacity of the Uganda
Wildlife Authority to conduct conservation work all over the country,
Wagaba has left behind a legacy of strong community relations which
provide some hope for Bwindi Park.
Paul Wagaba was the last surviving child of 12 brothers and sisters and
leaves behind a wife and five children, the youngest of whom is 18
months old. He was buried on 5 March near his mother’s home in
Kasero-Buloba near Kampala.
Wagaba had planned to further his knowledge of park management by
taking a diploma at the Mweka College of Wildlife Management in
Tanzania. Considering his strong interest in education and the crucial
need for training local people of his calibre, a scholarship scheme is
being set up in his name at Mweka College so that other young
Ugandans can carry on his work. Contributions can be made to WWF-
UK Panda House, Weyside Park, Godalming GU7 1XR.
Edward Matthew
Paul Wagaba, conservationist: born Mpigi District, Uganda 1966;
married (five children); died Bwindi, Uganda 1 March 1999.
This obituary was first published in the Independent, London, March 1999.
Comments from members of the Collaborative
Management Working Group
“Having had the pleasure and good fortune to have taken part in one of
the early stirrings towards this effort in Uganda, courtesy Grazia [Borrini-
Feyerabend] and IUCN, I am all the more saddened by Wagaba’s
untimely and tragic demise.  
Is there some way in which we can collectively (as the CMWG, or some
other grouping) issue some sort of tribute, and a message to the
Ugandan wildlife authorities that this should hopefully not be a setback,
in any way, to their efforts towards moving the management of Uganda’s
Park Authorities towards collaboration?”
Ashish Kothari
“Bwindi offers the first examples of written Collaborative Management
agreements developed for Uganda’s National Parks.  The Memoranda of
Understanding developed between local parishes and the Uganda
Wildlife Authority have been inspiring for other parks in Uganda and
elsewhere.
It would be important to follow the consequences of this violent act in the
CM approach.  In the Congo Basin, the GTZ-IUCN project on CM is –
among other matters – looking into the effects of unstable socio-political
conditions.  Preliminary results seem to show both problems and
opportunities for CM in difficult socio-political circumstances”
Grazia Borrini-Feyerabend
“As we are seeing around the world, all kinds of innocent and wonderful
people, irrespective of whether they are working on CM or not, are
getting killed ruthlessly by senseless fanatics (including powerful
governments).
Those of us who can, should do anything possible to fight against the
growing trends towards fundamentalism, ethnic hatred and general
suppression of human rights”.
Madhu Sarin
OBITUARY
Paul Wagaba
On 1 March the tragic news broke that in a brutal bid for international
publicity Rwandan rebels had stormed the Bwindi Impenetrable National
Park headquarters in Uganda and killed eight tourists and one Ugandan.
A great deal was reported at the time about the tourists who died but
there was barely a mention of Paul Wagaba, a park warden, who was
murdered during the assault.
Wagaba deserves to be remembered not just for his heroic actions
defending the tourists, but also for the outstanding contribution he made
to the conservation of Bwindi Park, famous as home to over half of the
world’s 650 remaining mountain gorillas.
Born in the Mpigi District of Uganda in 1966, Paul Wagaba became a
talented student and graduated at the top of his class at the Katwe
Wildlife College. Dennis Babasa, his professor there, remembers him as
one of the brightest students he ever taught and an especially skilled
communicator. He was ideally suited for his role as Community
Conservation Warden at Bwindi Park which he took up in 1995, and
where he was given the task of bringing the local people on board to
help protect the forest.
Set up as a National Park in 1991, Bwindi faced an uncertain future. It
had become a forest island, surrounded by agricultural land in one of the
most densely populated regions of central Africa. It also bordered
Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, a region wracked by
civil war.
When the park was founded, relations with local communities were at a
very low point. People were accustomed to taking what they needed
from the park and they resented the loss of access to a forest, which
they depended upon, for essential resources such as medicines and
agricultural products. The park was threatened by encroachment and the
gorilla population was in decline.
Wagaba played a critical role in helping to forge unprecedented
agreements between local people and the park to give the communities
controlled access to non-timber resources in Bwindi. By doing so he was
helping to secure the future not only of the park but also of the local
people.
In addition he worked closely with many of the non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) that had community-based projects in the park,
including those run by WWF, Care-DTC and the Institute of Tropical
Forest Conservation.
By last year, encroachment into the park has ceased and the gorilla
population had at last stabilised. This was a major achievement in such
a poverty-stricken and unstable region and stands as a classic case
study of how conservation can be achieved by the development needs
of the local people.
Wagaba firmly believed in passing these conservation values on to
future generations and invested considerable time presenting
conservation education programs to children living in the area and to
school groups visiting Bwindi. He was known as an excellent
communicator and people of all ages and all parts of society liked and
trusted him.
A long-time friend and colleague, Benon Mugyerwas, described how
Wagaba served as a role model to the junior wardens and rangers
working with him, always willing to offer guidance and help them
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WTO High-Level Symposium on Trade and
Environment
Geneva, Switzerland, 15-16 March 1999
Full report to follow in next issue.
WTO High-Level Symposium on Trade and
Development
Geneva, Switzerland, 17-18 March 1999
Trade and Sustainable Development Workshops
Hanoi, Vietnam, 9-10 April 1999
Islamabad, Pakistan, 12-14 April 1999
Two of a series of five seminars, being held under the IISD - IDRC
project on Capacity Building for Trade and Sustainable Development
IUCN Council Meeting
IUCN HQ, Gland, Switzerland, 16-18 April 1999
IPCC Expert Meeting on Development,
Sustainability and Equity
Colombo, Sri Lanka, 27-29 April 1999
IPCC Working Group 3 Lead Authors Meeting
Colombo, Sri Lanka, 30 April – 1 May 1999
13th Session of the Global Biodiversity Forum
Supporting the Ramsar/CBD work programme
San Jose, Costa Rica, 7-9 May 1999
The 13th CBD will focus on designing appropriate mechanisms to
ensure effective implementation of the Joint Work Plan between the
Convention on Wetlands and the Convention on Biological Diversity,
which was endorsed at the 4th meeting of the COP to the CBD (May
1998). GBF13 will also focus on synergies between the Ramsar
Convention and the other biodiversity-related conventions such as the
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Convention to
Combat Desertification, on matters related to the conservation of
biodiversity in inland water ecosystems and marine and coastal zones.
For further information: http://www.iucn.org/themes/gbf/13/announce.html
International Conference on Integrated
Conservation and Development
Quito, Ecuador, 12-14 May 1999
Integrated conservation and development projects (ICDPs) aim to
achieve the dual goals of improving management of natural resources
while uplifting the quality of life of local people. This conference will bring
together practitioners and theorists from around the world to discuss and
debate how the ICDPphilosophy can be most effectively implemented.
While the focus is on Tropical America, the lessons learned are globally
relevant.
The following topics will be addressed:
• building capacity for integrated conservation and development;
• resolving conservation and development dilemmas;
• using advocacy to promote integrated conservation and development;
• creating economic incentives for the conservation of biodiversity;
• creating cultural and social incentives for conservation and develop-
ment;
• rethinking sustainable harvests of non-timber forest products;
• linking vertically and laterally in project execution;
• combining scientific and local research knowledge.
CALENDAR
Next Issue
The next issue of Policy Matters will feature Sustainable Livelihoods
(as previously advertised). If you would like to contribute an article on
this theme, or have news or comments you would like to flag up, please
contact the Editor, Catherine McCloskey, IIED, 3 Endsleigh Street,
London WC1H ODD; fax: +44 171 388 2117; 
email: catherine.mccloskey@iied.org 
The deadline for contributions is May 31 1999.
Contact: Jody Stallings, Co-ordinator, Agriculture and Natural Resources
Sector; CARE Ecuador; email:jstallin@care.org.ec; or Robert Rhoades,
Programme manager, professor of anthropology, University of Georgia;
email: rrhoades@arches.uga.edu
4th Meeting of the Subsidiary body on Scientific,
Technical and Technological Advice of the
Convention on Biological Diversity 
Montreal, Canada, 24-28 May 1999
ECOSUD 99 - Second International Conference on
Ecosystems and Sustainable Development
Lemnos, Greece, 31 May - 2 June 1999
Contact: Clare Duggan, ECOSUD 99, Wessex Institute of Technology,
Ashurst Lodge, Ashurst, Southampton SO40 7AA, UK; email:
cduggan@wessex.ac.uk.
Intersessional Meeting on the Operations of the
Convention on Biological Diversity
Montreal, Canada, 1-3 June 1999
1999 Open Meeting of the Human Dimensions of
the Global Environmental Change Research
Community
Kangawa, Japan: 24-26 June 1999
Aims to bring together researchers interested in the human causes and
impacts of global environmental change, to exchange information on
current research and teaching and promote networking and community
building. Topics include: conflict and the environment; lifestyles, attitudes
and behaviour; valuation of ecosystem services; and, decision-making
processes in response to global change.
For more information contact: HDGEC Secretariat, IGES, Shonan
Village 1560-39, Kamiyamaguchi, Hayama, Kanagawa 240-0198, Japan;
Fax: +81 468 553709; Email: hdgec.iges.or.jp; Website:
http://www.iges.or.jp
Global Changes and Protected Areas
International Symposium - L’Aquila, Italy, 8-16 September 1999
Global change has made it urgent to find early warning signs of the
effect on the environment. The Abruzzo Region in Central Italy which
has devoted one third of its territory to nature reserves, is organising this
symposium to assess the present status of research in this field. The
meeting will deal with climatic and environmental changes and their
impact on the biosphere and hydrology. A section will be devoted to the
socio-economic implications for the protected areas, and a case study
will be proposed for the Abruzzi Natural parks.
For more information contact: Guido Visconti, Dipartimento di Fisica,
Universita degli Studi di L’Aquila Via Vetoio, Coppito, 67010 L’Aquila,
Italy; email: guido.visconti@aquila.infn.it; website:
http://www.aquila.infn.it/gblch
